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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 22, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 79-1380-ADX 
HARRIS, Secy HEW 
v. 
WILSON 
m ND ) 11. (Bua) 
3~ Ct-~ 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: HEW appeals from an order of the DC holding 42 
u.s.c. § 1382(e) (1) (A)-(B) unconstitutional insofar as it 
e,xc i ud;; ~divi __ duals between the ages of 21 and 65 who reside 
in public mental institutions from Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) benefits. 
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2. FACTS and STATUTORY BACKGROUND: This case involves 
appellees' entitlement to a monthly $25 SSI payment normally 
made to otherwise eligible persons residing in medical 
institutions, but denied to appellees because they are 
institutionalized in public mental health hospitals and are 
between the ages of 21 and 65. This payment is made to 
eligible individuals for their personal n~eds -- reading 
material, non-institutional clothing, pay phones, toiletries, 
and the like --and not for medical care, food, and shelter. 
42 u.s.c. § 1382(e) (1) (A) states that no person is eligible 
for SSI benefits with respect to any month in which he is 
inmate of a public institution. Subsection (B), however, 
states an exception to that exclusion where the individual --
resides in any health care facility receiving Medicaid 




entitled  with respect to that individual. Such individuals are 
to a limited payment of up to $25 a month. Appellees are ~ 
~xcluded from these benefits because the Medicaid statute does
~ot cover inpatient hospital or skilled nursing home services~~ 
~;;an institution for tuberculosis or ~s, with tw
~ns -- services for individuals over 65, and service s in 
~a p~~ital for individuals under 21. See 42 u.s.c. 
~ 1-9 1,3~(1)' (4)' (15)' (16). 
Appellees filed a class action in the ND Ill. claiming that 
/ the exclusion of aged, blind and/or disabled individuals from 
./) 
benefits received by other such individuals, simply because 
they reside in public mental health institutions, violates 
their rights to equal protection. (A consolidated action 
challenged the exclusion of pretrial detaine es from the same 
SSI benefits.) 
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3. OPINION BELOW: The DC denied relief to the pretrial 
detainees, but held that the statute was unconstitutional as 
/ 
applied to appellees. Th~ DC first determined that appellees 
were members of a "quasi-suspect" class because the statute 
excluded them from coverage, in part, because they were 
receiving treatment for me~tal illnesses. The DC identified 
sever a l indicia of suspect classes, including: whether the 
does 1\ot .·-
classification bear a relation to ability to perform; whether 
11 
it defines a politically impotent, insular minority; whether it 
defines a group that historically has been subject to unequal 
treatment; and whether the characteristic is immutable and 
frL 
determined solely by accident of birth. It concluded that the 
mentally ill were politically powerless, had historically been 
subjected to unequal treatment, and had received such treatment 
because of a factor over which they have no control. These 
f equal 
protection scrutiny to · y -classification at issue, 
requiring that it must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must 
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 
(Quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
Based on an examination of SSI's legislative history, the 
DC conclud,ed that the purpose of the stipend for residents of 
7 
public health institutions was to enable them to purchase small ~ 
comfort items not provided by the institution. There was~ ~~ 
articulated le "slative intent exclude residents of mental
health institutions from these and the DC could /_ 
rt:/~~ 
conceive of no reason why Congress would perceive that they 
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would not need such benefits. (In contrast, the legislative 
reports did focus on the fact that inmates in penal 
institutions would not be eligible for SSI.) 
HEW asserted three justifications for the exclusion of ~ 
appellees from the SSI scheme. The DC rejected them in turn. 
~ it held that an interest in conserving federal resources 
could not be served by making an invidious distinction between 
classes of citizens. ~· HEW argued t;,;t it wanted to 
insure that federal funds were received on behalf of residents 
living in qualified institutions. it argued that 
appellees were not similarly situated with Medicaid patients in 
terms of federal interest and control because their 
institutions were not receiving Medicaid payments on their 
behalf. With respect to both these arguments, the DC observed 
5.51 
that the SSI statute, as opposed · to ~edicaid, provided benefits ~4·f~ 
~1'-4/o 
t.u4t~;~~ to the residents themselves, not to their institutions. The 
.- ~-'-exclusion of appellees from SSI appeared to have been an ~ 
accidental by-product of that statute's incorporation of the
Medicaid eligibility scheme, rather than a purposeful decision 
to provide payments only to residents eligible for Medicaid. 
The DC concluded that the asserted governmental interests 
served by this mental health classification were not of 
sufficient importance to sustain the SSI exclusion, and granted 
appellees summary judgment on their equal protection claim. 
-tM.. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that SSI classification at 
1\ 
issue here is not based on mental health considerations, but on 
eligibility for Medicaid benefits. And he notes that the 
exclusion from Medicaid coverage of persons aged 21 to 65 
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residing in mental institutions has been upheld against equal 
protection attack. Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 
(SONY), aff'd, 414 u.s. 1058 -(1973); Kantrowitz v. Weinberger, 
388 F. Supp. 1127 (DC 1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1034 (CADC), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). The Medicaid exclusion was based 
on Congress• belief that the health needs of individuals 
residing in public institutions were being provided by the 
states. The SSI exclusion was based on the same belief. The 
SG recognizes that the broad exclusion is riddled with 
exceptions, but he states that there is nothing in the 
legislative record to suggest that Congress created the 
classification at issue here 11 because of 11 its adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group. (Citing Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney, 442 u.s. 256, 279 (1979).) 
Assuming that the statutory scheme does not classify SSI 
recipients on the basis of their mental health status, then it 
need only serve some rational objective in order to satisfy 
5~ 
constitutional standards. The SSI scheme is reasonable because  
it leaves to the states the responsibility of providing for the 
needs of persons in public mental health hospitals. Even 
assuming that the statutory scheme does classify recipients on 
the basis of their mental health, the SG quarrels with the DC's 
conclusion that such a classification must satisfy middle-tier 
equal protection scrutiny. Mental illness is not an immutable 
characteristic, and it is directly related to an individual's 
ability to perform in society. See Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 
70 4, 711 (CA3 1979) (the mentally i 11 are not a suspect 
class) • 
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Appellees have filed a motion to affirm, arguing that the re~ 
is no substantial question presented here warranting plenary ~ 
review. They emphasize that Congress never articulated a 
reason for excluding appellees' class from the SSI program. 
The available legislative reports in fact indicate that 
Congress believed it was providing for monthly $25 payments to 
the residents of all medical institutions. 
Second, it is true that some mental patients (those 
residing in private institutions, or those under 21 and over 
65) receive SSI benefits, but the fact remains that appellees 
health 
status. Third, the SG's contention that appellees are excluded 
from SSI because they are excluded from Medicaid is untenable )?~~ 
-... .......... 
Jll \.) 
-- residents of private mental hospitals are excluded from 
~ 
Medicaid, but they receive SSI payments. The exclusion of 
appellees from SSI was fortuitous -- the accidental result~ 
the interaction of two complex statutes. 
s-..s I hL.-~ - ~ '"' 
Fourth, that the exclusion of appellees' class from ,~
Medicaid payments has been affirmed as constitutional does not 
dictate a like result with respect to the SSI exclusion. 
Medicaid exclusion for residents of mental hospitals was 
on congressional reluctance to fund extremely expensive 





traditionally served by the states. The purpose of SSI is to 
provide subsistence grants for non-medical costs on a uniform 
national basis. Congress' concern about directly subsidizing '-------..... 
mental institutions through Medicaid has no bearing on the 
denial of SSI benefits for patients' personal needs not met by 
the institutions' provision of food, shelter, and medical care. 
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Fiscal concerns cannot justify this invidious legislative 
discrimination. Moreover, the government's fiscal interest in 
this case is insubstantial. While the SG asserts that the 
annual cost of paying SSI to appellees' would be about $95 
million, see j.s. at 7 n.8, a more realistic estimate would be 
about $6 million, or 0.1% of the annual total cost of SSI. 
All of these arguments indicate that the exclusion of 
appellees from SSI is not even rationally related to any 
legitimate governmental purpose. A summary affirmance here 
will not affirm the DC's application of heightened scrutiny to 
....._..:.....-
classifications based on mental health. Nonetheless, the DC's 
use of middle-tier scrutiny in this context was correct. It is ------perverse for the government to argue that the mentally disabled 
are not deserving of special judicial protection when the 
program at issue was designed to compensate for the inability 
of its beneficiaries to perform or contribute to society, and 
the exclusion of appellees from that program will prolong or 
intensify their disabilities. 
~. DISCUSSION: Appellees make a persuasive case in arguing 
that their exclusion from SSI was not based on a conscious 
congressional desire to benefit only those residents of medical 
7 
institutions that are also eligible for Medicaid. I tend to ~l.;t 
agree with the DC's conclusion that the exclusion of appellees 
from the SSI program was the accidental effect of the 
~
interaction of the SSI statute with the Medicaid statute. 
However, for that very reason, it is difficult for appellees to 
maintain that their exclusion from SSI was invidious. While I 
believe that appellees' exclusion from SSI was irrational when 
( 
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viewed in the light of that program's purposes, I am not 
certain that this Court should reach that conclusion 
summarily. A summary affirmance here would seem to be unwise 
for two additional reasons. First, confusion might result from 
a comparison of this case with the Court's past affirmance in 
Legion. Second, a summary affirmance could be read as 
approving the DC's holding that the mentally ill are a 
quasi-suspect class, a conclusion that seems deserving of 
plenary review. 
I recommend a NOTE. 
There is a motion to affirm. 
Murphy 5/12/80 Op in j.s. 
'-'V'-'111&1 o o o o o o o o o • o o • • toot t t 
Argued .................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
Also motion to affirm. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Peter Byrne 
DATE: November 30, 1980 
RE: No. 79-1380, Harris, Sec'y v. Wilson 
Question Presented 
Does 42 u.s.c. § 16ll(e) (1) violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, because it excludes from the provision of 
.' ' 
2. 
Supplemental Security Income payments persons otherwise 
eligible who reside in public mental health institutions? 
I 
This appeal is before the Court because a federal DC 
(Bua, ND Ill) held § 16ll(e) (1) (B) unconstitutional. The DC 
reached this consclusion by holding that the statute classifies 
on the basis of mental health, that persons with mental 
disablities are a "quasi-suspect" class, and that the 
classification is not substantially related to an important 
legislative objective. The SG disputes the premise of the DC's 
decision; he argues that the statute does not discriminate 
S6-
against the mentally handicapped, but draws a classification on 
A ~'---------------------
the basis of whether residents of public institutions are 
~- ~-----------------------------------------eligible for Medicaid benefits. The SG argues further that this 
classification has a rational basis and is, therefore, 
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. To analyze 
necessary to determin~hat classification the 
an~hether ~hat classification survives the 
this case it is 
statute draws, 
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. 
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
provides monthly cash payments to indigent persons who are 
aged, blind, or disabled. Section 16ll(e) provides that no 
person shall be eligible for SSI payments who "is an inmate of 




from this prohibition; an otherwise eligible 
w-t.o 
in a public health care facility t ,b:m: is receiving 
3. 
Medicaid benefits on his account is entitled to receive limited 
SSI payments of $25 per month. A significant group whose health 
care is excluded from Medicaid coverage is persons between ages 
21 and 65 who are in public mental institutions. Appellees 
concede that this distinction in Medicaid coverage , is -
constitutional, Appellees brief at 17. Leg ion v. Richardson, 
354 F.Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.) (three judge court), aff'd sub nom . 
../ Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973). But appellees do 
argue that the distinction is unconstitutional in the provision 
of SSI benefits. The Medicaid exclusion is justified by 
Congress's recognition that the provision of services to the 
mentally disabled in public institutions is a traditional state 
function. 
first issue is what classification does the 
Not all mentally disabled persons are denied SSI 
mental illness is a disability that can 
render a person eligible for SSI 





institutions or whose treatment in such institutions is covered 
by Medicaid receive at least some SSI benefits~f · the mentally 
disabled person was not institutionalized,~ was 
(!l) 
institutionalized in private facility, or was resident in a 
public "group horne" or halfway house containing less than 16 
residents, he would receive full SSI benefits if otherwise -
eleigible. If he were in a public general health care facility r receiving Medicare 
[_ mental illness, or 
l; 
funds to pay the costs of treating the 
if he were younger than 21 or older than 65 
4. 
and in a public mental hospital, , he would receive the limited 
$25 per month SSI payment. Conversely, the statute excludes 
from SSI benefit~bersons suffering from no mental disablitiy: 
I);.\ . d t . "'bl. t b 1 . 't . (5':) . d t . l ~es1 en s 1n pu 1c u ercu os1s san1 ar1ums, res1 en s 1n 
public medical institutions in states with a 21 day limitation 2 
on benefits, an~Jrsons in unlicensed private facilities. 
Given this framework, it is difficult to say that the 
statute draws a classification on the basis of mental illness. 
Appellees argue, however, that because persons between 21 and 
65 who reside in public general hospitals receive SSI benefits, 
the distinction that prevents the provision of SSI benefits to 
appelleesis the modifier "mental". A statute that excluded from 
similar benefits 22-64 year old residents of public hospitals 
for women would create a gender-based classififcation. 
Moreover, the fact that not all mental patients are excluded 
from benefits does not lessen the fact that those injured are 
mental patients. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 u.s. 1, 7-9 
(1977). 
This argument has some appeal if the question is 
looked at technically and myopically. However, Nyquist, as the 
SG notes, is inapposite, because there only members of the 
suspect class were injured by the classification: here 
nonmental patients are also denied the benfits. More 
importantly, the nature of the classification argued seems 
strained. Some mental patients receive benefits, some non-____ _____....., 
mental disadvantaged persons do not. The classification seems 
to turn on the traditional source of funding that the treatment 
5. 
involved here has received. It is artificial to separate out 
the malady from the means of treating it, when the statute 
requires both to be present for the benefits to be denied. As 
this Court has said, "The proper classification for purposes of 
equal protection analysis is not an exact science". Califano v. 
Boles, 443 u.s. 282, 293 (1979). Here, a fair reading of what 
line Congress intended to draw directs attention to the 
Medicaid exclusion, which is premised on state provision of 
public mental health institutions. The SSI exclusion follows 
this, and focuses on the source of funding that the service 
generally has. Thus, I think it artificial to say that Congress 
drew the line on the basis of mental health. 
If the classification is not drawn on the basis of 
mental disability, it is unnecessary to reach the question of 
whether such classifications require heightened judicial~ 
scrutiny. This is a good result because there is almost no law 
on this question. There is an emotional appeal to giving the 
mentally disabled some special status in the Constitution: they 
have often been treated shamefully and they posseess little 
political power themselves. Nonetheless, finding that a class 
is suspect or "quasi-suspect" for purposes of the Equal 
Protection Clause contains a judgment that legislatures should 
avoid drawing distinctions as to the class in general 
legislation. The mentally disabled are in a real sense wards of 
the state and properly should be special subjects of 
legislation. Public consideration of their limitations require 




Thus, it seems inappropriate to subject classifications drawn 
on mental health to heightened scrutiny. 
II 
.~ ~w 
TheA. quest ion ~ rem a~ w_h_e_t_h_e_r _ t_h_e __ e_x_c_l_u_s_l_· o_n_ of 
residents of public mental institutions has a rational basis. 
To state this question in regard to a federal welfare measure 
is perhaps to answer it. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 u.s. 435 
(1972) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 41 (1970) form the 
perameters of the inquiry: the distinction drawn need have only 
some rational basis. 
A. 
1 
"~ Appellees argue with effect that the classification 
~ is unwise and unfair. The basic constitutional claim is that 
incorporating the limits of the Medicaid Act into the SSI 
program without regard to the different policies the two Acts 
serve results in a classification that is irrational in terms 
of the objectives of SSI. The appellees need the assistance of 
SSI to the same or greater extent than do all other eligible 
recipients. They argue that a proper line in a welfare program 
~
is one "necessitated by the nature and purposes of the 
program." In support of this proposition, appellees cite u.s. 
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 412 U.S. 508 (1973), where the 
Court struck down a Food Stamp limitation as creating an 
irrebutable presumption. In Murray, you joined Justice 
Rehnquit's dissent, which argued that the majority had deviated 
unjustifiably from the Dandridge analysis. Thus, you probably 
will not be persuaded by appellees reliance on that case. In 
7. 
any event, there is no claim here that § 1611 (e) creates an 
~rrebutable presumption. 
The SG argues that the classification is rational 
because Congress could properly decide to provide benefits to 
public institution residents whose treatment was being funded 
by Medicaid, but exclude those public institution residents 
whose treatment is wholly funded by the state. Put another way, 
the classification is rationally related to the legitimate 
desire to avoid spending federal funds on individuals whose 
basic care and treatment are already being provided by the 
tate. Appellees respond to this that the SSI benefits are 
unrelated to the costs of care and treatment provided by 
~-----~-------------------------Medicaid. 
The rational basis urged by the SG is tenuous at ~ 
best, but I reluctantly conclude that it satisfies the limited 
~
~------------- ~----~ 
demands the Court may place upon the legislature under the 
Dandridge test. As appellees argue, the structure of the 
limited SSI program for residents of any public institution 
suggests that the provision of $25 per month is in addition to 
the costs of medical treatment met by Medicaid. That the state 
provides the equivelent of Medicaid payments does not mean that 
the state also will provide the additional disposable income 
provided by the limited SSI payment. However, the 
classification could plausibly be read to encompass a judgment 
that when the state provides the medical care for residents of 
public institutions, it is also the province of the state to 
decide whether additional benefits should be provided to the 
r 
8. 
inmate. Congress must draw the line somewhere, and I cannot say ,....--..--
that this line is wholly lacking in any basis. 
To lessen' the harshness of this exclusion, Congress 
provided that reidents of public mental institutions who are 
under 21 or over 65 would receive the limited benefit be~e 
of their special needs. This distinction in itself does not 
rise to a constitutional problem, but it does cast further 
doubt on the rationality of the basic classification. It 
recognizes that at least in cetain classes, state benefits are 
insufficient. Nonetheless, I cannot say that the classification 
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79-1380 Harris v. Wilson Conf. 12/5/80 
Chief Justice 1(.L.,.,..,.._-<--
~ ~ ~~-l!c~.(.. ~ 
lA- . 5 k ~ ..;.,_ )&·"4!44A4<•'" ~ 
/..c.?~~~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan ~ 




Mr. Justice White ~ 
~ ......... ~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall~. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun ~ 
ec.• ~ ....-z.,...c 
Mr. Justice Powell ~ 
,J ~ .. <-~H·••d;;j r~~ 
~ 4,...-~~~~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist ~ .. -c:: .. ~ 
I: 
. ~ . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, JR. 
RE: 
.§u:prmtt C!fourl o-f firt ~b .§tw,g-
1l'Ct$fri:n~ gl. Q}. 20,?)!.~ 
December 15, 1980 
No. 79-1380 Harris v. Wilson 
Dear Thurgood, Lewis and John: 
We four were to affirm in the above. Would you 
Lewis be willing to undertake the dissent? 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Since?Jly, 
. l 
·-"7 I /? ... (' \.-l. 
December 16, 1980 
79-1380 Harris v. Wilson 
Dear Bill: 
I will be glad to undertake the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Peter: I suggest that you give priority to the draft on 
your assigned Court opinion, and then tackle this dissent. 
To: The Chief Justio~ 
Mr. Just~ Bf. Mr . Justi e S 
Mr . Just .. _; it 
Mr. ·Just j , \( '.rshall 
Mr. J u:jtl -ll 
Mr. Ju.:; t:i 'Uist 
Mr. Ju:Jt l , . , · ~ns 
l!'rom: Mr . Jus t h . .; Blackmun 
Ciroula ted: JAN l : l981 
1st DRAFT 
R>cirnulatad: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATIB , ~ 
No. 79-1380 1 ~ 6 
Patricia R. }Iarris, Seeretary of . );ti ~uJY 
Health ~nd Hum&n Services On Appeal from the Umted 
Appellant ' States District Court for .J-.o;;:::y 
' the Northern District of 
v. Ill' . / . mms. t/'-' 
Charles Edward W1lson et al. · 
[January - , 1981] 
JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether Congress constitutionally 
may decline to grant Supplemental Security Income benefits 
to a class of otherwise eligible individuals who are excluded 
because they are aged 21 through 64 and are institutionalized 
in public mental institutions that do not receive Medicaid 
funds for their care. The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois held unconstitutional, under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that portion 
of the Social Security Act, as amended, that excludes these 
ot erwise el gible persons from the supplemental benefits. 
rrhe Secretary of Health and Human Services has taken a 
direct appeal to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. 
I 
In October 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act 
(Act) to create the federal Supplemeutal Security Income 
program (SSI) effective January 1, 1974. 86 Stat. 1465, ~2 
U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. This program was intended "[t]o 
assist those who cannot work because of age, blindness, or 
disability," S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 4 (1972) , by "set[ting] a 
79-1380-0PINION 
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Federal guaranteed minimum income level for aged, blind, 
and disabled persons," id., at 12.1 
The SSI program provides a subsistence allowance, under 
federal standards, to the Nation's needy aged, blind, and 
disabled.2 Included within the category of "disabled" under 
the program are all those "unable to engage in any substant;al 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which call be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 
§ 1614 (a)(3)(A) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). 
Although the SSI program is broad in its reach, its coverage 
is not complete. :From its very inception, the program has 
excluded from eligibility anyone who is an "inmate of a 
public institution." § 1611 (e) (l)(A) of the Act, as amended, 
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e)(1) (A) .u Also from the program's in-
ception, Congress has made a partial exception to this ex-
1 The Supplemental Security Income program, Title XVI of the Social 
Security Act, largely replaced the prior system of federal grants to state-. 
run U&>istance programs for the aged, blind, and d'sabled col"tained in 
Title;; I, X, XIV, and XVI of the Act, that is, Old Age Assistance, 49 
Stat. 620, a:; amended, 42 U.S. C.§ 301 et seq.; Aid to the Blind, 49 Stat. 
645, as amended, 42 U. S C. § 1201 et seq.; Aid to the Permanently and 
Totally Disabled, 64 Stat. 555, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1351 et srq. ,· 
and Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled, 76 Stat . 197 , 42 U. S. C. § 1381 
et seq. (1970 ed.). See Califano v Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170, 171 (1978); 
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 2 (1978) . 
2 To be eligible for SSI benefits, a person must be "aged," that is, 65 
or older, or "blind/' or "disabled," as tho:;£> terms are defined in § 1614 
of the Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1382c, and his income and resources 
mut>t be below the levels specified in §lOll (a), as amended, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1382 (a) . 
8 Section 1611 (e) (l)(A), as amended, provides : 
" (e) Limitation on eligibility of certain individuals 
" (l)(A) Except as provided in :subparagraph (B) and (C), no perscn 
shall be an eligible individual or eligible spouse for purp:-~ses of this sub-
chapter with respect to any month if throughout such mouth he is all 
Inmate of a public institution.'' 
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elus-ion by !Jroviding a small amount of money (not exceeding 
$300 per year) to any otherwise eligible person in ((a hospital, 
extended care facility, nursing home, or intermediate care 
facility receiving payments (with respect to such individual 
or spouse) under a State plan approved under· subchapter 
XIX fMedicaid] ... " § 1611 (e)(l)(B), as amended, 42 
U. S. C. § 1382 (e)(l)(B).1 Congress thus, while excluding 
1 Section 1611 (e)(l} (B), as amended, modifying § 1611 (e) (l)(A), as 
amended, states: 
"(B) In any ca~e where an elig:ble individual or his e'igible sr-ouse (if 
any) is, throughout any month, in a hospital, extended care facility, nurs-
ing hornt', or intermediate care fa!!ility receiving paym::nts (with resper t 
1o surh individual or spouse) under a State plan approvc•d under title 
XIX, the benefit under this title for ::;uch individual for such month ~>hall 
be payable-
"(i) at a rate not in excess of $300 per year (reduced by the amount 
of any income not excluded pursuant to section 1612 (b)) in the case of an 
individual who does not have an eligible spouse; 
"(ii) in the eas" of an individual who has an elig:ble spouse, if only one 
of them is in such a hospitlll, home or facility throughout ruch month, at 
a mte not in excess of the sum of-
" (I) the rate of $300 per y!:'ar (redur~d by the amount of an} inrom!:', 
not excluded pursuant to seetion 1612 (b), of the one who is in such 
hosnital, hom!:', or facility), and 
" (II) the applicable rate ,;pecified in subsection (b) ( 1) (reduced by 
t he amount of <1DY income, not excluded punmant to ~-ection 1612. (b), of 
the ot hPr); and 
"(iii) at a rate not in excess of $6'.)0 per year (reduced by the amount 
of any in rome not excluded pursuant. to sectif'n 1G12 (b)) in the case of 
an indiddual who has an Pli~rible spouse, if both of them arP in such a 
ho:;pital, home. or facility throughout surh month." 
Subsection (C) of § 1382 (e)(l), not implicated in this case, further 
modifies § 1611 (e)(l)(A), as amend(•d, by providing: 
"((') A:; usC'd in subparagraph (A), the term 'public institutbn' does not 
inrlude a ymblicly operated eommunity r-esidPnce which serve::; no more 
than Hi rel'idents " 
Added in 1976 by Pub L. 94-566, § 505 (a), 90 Stat. 2686, this subsec~ 
tion met objections that § 1611 (e) impeded reform efforts to de-institu4 
tionalizr rert11in group::: of handicapJ)Cd individuals, such as the mentally 
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generally any per~n residing in a public institution, explicitly 
has tied eligibility for a reduced amount of SSI benefits to 
residence in an institution receiving Med aid benefits or t e 
care of the eligible indiyidual. 
Appellees brought this suit to challenge this resulting de-
tail of Congress' having conditioned the limited assistance 
grant on eligibility for Medicaid: a person between the ages 
of 21 through 64: who resides in a public mental institution 
is not eligible to receive this small stipend, even though that 
person meets the other eligibility requirements for SSI bene-
fits, because treatment in a public mental institution for a 
person in this age bracket is not funded under Medicaid.5 
retarded. Congress determined to encourage the establishment of state-
run group homes for such people by making residents in these institutiors 
eligible for SSI benefits. See S. Rep No. 94-1265, p. 29 (1976); H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1745, pp. 27-28 (1976) . 
'5 Federal funds are available under the Medic-aid program to pa.y for 
the following "residential" services: "inpatient hospital services (other 
than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases)," § 1905 
(a)(l), 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (a)(l); "skilled nursing facility services 
(other than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases) 
for individuals 21 years of age or older," § 1905 (a) ( 4) (A); "inpatient 
hospital services, skilled nur~ing facility services, and intermediate care 
facility services for individl.)als 65 years of age or over in an institution 
for tuberculosis or mental diseases," § 1905 (a) (14); "intermediate care 
facility services (other than such services in an institution for tuberculosis 
or mental diseases) for individuals . . . in need of such care," § 1905 (a.) 
(15); certain ''inpatient psychiatric hospital services for individuals under 
a~e 21," §§ 1905 (a)(16) and (h) . Subsection (17)(B) of § 1905 (a), 
which provides for funding of any other medical or remedial care recog-
nized under state law, specifically excludes "payments with respect to 
care or servicff> for any individual who has not attained 65 years of age 
and who is a patient in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases."· 
In 1950, when it first ena.cted federal grunts for medical assistance, Con-
gress excluded "any individual who ii:! a patient in an "institution for ... 
mental diseases" from eligibility. 64 Stat 558. This exclusion was incor-
porated into the Medicaid statute in 1965, 79 Stat .. 352, but exceptions 
were made for the needy aged in mental iu~titutions, and for the care of 
~t1t~iL1ly ill pt>t:SOml m general ll\erli..cal Ja.cj}jties. Ibid. In 1972, in the-
I 
I 
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Appellees attack this statutory classification as violative of 
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.11 Their challenge, successful in the Dis~ 
trict Court, is two-fold. First, they argue that the exclusion 
of their class of mentally il1 (and therefore disabled) persons 
bears no rational relationship to any legitimate objective of 
the SSI program. They assert, in fact, that their class was 
excluded inadvertently because of its political powerlessness. 
Brief for Appellees 6, 32. Second, they insist that because the 
statute classifies on the basis of mental illness, a factor that 
· greatly resembles other characteristics that this Court has 
found inherently "suspect" as a means of legislative classi~ 
fication, specia.J justification should be required for the con~ 
gressional decision to exclude appellees, 
II 
'This case has had a somewhat complex procedural history. 
It initially Wa$ instituted in December 1973 as a class action 
for injunctive and declaratory relief to challeuge the federal 
and Illinois assistance schemes that prevailed prior to the 
effective date of the ssr program. See Wilson V. Edelman, 
542 F. 2d 1260, 1263-1266 (CA7 1976). The then existing 
state assistance program, for which federal funds were re-
ceived, excluded from eligibility auy person who was residing 
in a public mental or tuberculosis institution or who was con-
bill ell!tcting the SSI program, Congress further broadened Medicaid bene-
fits :for the mentally ill to include most children in mental institutions. 
86 Stat. 1461. A Senate proposal for demonstration pwjecl$ to invesrti-
ga.le the possibility of extending Medicaid benefits to the mentaJly ill be-
tween t.he ages of 21 through 64 in m~>ntal ho~pitals e eated at. that 
time, See S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p . 281 (1972); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 
92-1605, p. 65 (1972) . 
6 This Court repeatedly has lwld that. the Fifth Amendment imposes 
on t.he Federal Government the same standard required of state legisla.-
t.ion by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment See, 
e. g., Weinberge1· v. Salji, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770 (1975); Riclta.rrlson v. 
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1»71). 
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fined in a penal institution. !d., at 1263, n. 2. The plain-
tiffs later amended their complaint to include a challenge to 
the SSI exclusion, which by then had come into effect. ld., 
at 1266. A three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S. C. 
§§ 2281 and 2282 (1970 ed.) (since repealed by Pub. L. 94-
381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119). The case was consolidated 
witb another that challenged the exclusion from SSI benefits 
of any pretrial detainee. Relying on Weinberger v. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749 (1975), the court granted the Secretary's mo-
tion to dismiss both cases for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the p1aiutiffs had failed to exhaust the 
administrative remedies provided for by § 1631 ( c )(3) of the 
Act. as amended, 42 U S. C. § 1383 (c)(3). See 542 F. 2d, 
at 1267- 1268.7 
On appeal, appellees abandoned their claims under the pr:or 
federal statutes. ld., at 1271. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal, hold-
ing that the Secretary had waived any requirement of exhaus-
tion by her submission of the case to the District Court for 
summary disposition. 8 !d., at 1272. Because the plaintiffs 
had dropped their request for injunctive relief, the case was 
remanded to the single-judge District Court. ld., at 1269. 
7 The three-judge court also found that the state statute classified on the 
basis of age, not menta! health, a.nd that it was rational and constitutional. 
The Court of Appeals declined to review that. constitutional holding on the 
ground tha.t review from the three-judge court could be had only in this 
Court. Wilson v. Edel11Uln, 542 F . 2d, at 1276-1282. 
8 The Court of Appeals also held that. only two of the named pla.intiffs, 
Maudie Simmons and John Kiernan 'I'urney, had sati~:>1ied the minimum, 
nonwaivable requirement of 42 U. S. C . § 4{)5 (g) that a party may seek 
review only o£ a "final deci::;iou of the Secret.ury" denying, terminating, or 
su::;pending U('!Jefits under the SSI jJrcgram. The other named plaintiff~, 
including Charlet> Wilson, were eligiblE' for, or had sought. and been denied, 
beneiiti! only tmder the prior cooperative ~tate-federal prograrru;, and 
therefore they were dJt>mJssed as partie:>. We have retained W1lson as a 
named party in the caption of this ca~:>e , however, as tlid the DistricL 
Court on ren1und1 for the ,;ake of unifonnity. 
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That court, on remand, certified the class 9 and granted ap-
pellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that § 1382 
(e)'s exclusion of the class members violated the equal pro-
tection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 478 F. Supp. 1046 (ND Ill. 1979).10 The Dis-
trict Court reasoned that the statute "creates three classifica-
tions: (1) age, and (2) residence in a public, (3) mental health 
hospital." !d., at 1050. It ruled that Congress' use of the 
first two factors need be justified only by demonstration of 
their "rational relationship" to "a legitimate state interest." 
Ibid. Under that standard, these classifications withstood 
scrutiny. Congress' use, however, of a "mental health" clas-
sification was deemed to require a closer examination because 
"mental health classifications possess the significant indicia of 
the suspect classifications recognized in other cases." Id., at 
1052. Although recognizing that the mentally ill as a group 
do not demonstrate all the characteristics this Court has con-
sidered as denoting inherently suspicious classificatious, such 
as race and national origin,t1 the District Court believed that 
9 The class was defined as: 
''all personti residing in HEW Region V who have been terminated from 
benefits under Title XVI, or who lmve applied for Supplemental Security 
Income benefits under Title XVI and have l>een denied such benefits, on 
or after January 1, 1974, solely because they are between the ages of 21 
and 65 and hospitalized iu a public mental in::;titution." App. to Juri::; . 
Statement 21a. 
10 The District Court denied, however, the elaim of the pretrbl dehlinees 
to the monthly stipend, applying a "rational rPlation" standard and find-
ing the exclu8ion rational l>ecuuse ''[t]he detainee status is necessarily 
tempomry in naturP, and the [Secretary] could legitimately wish to with-
hold these extra-sub~i:;tenee payments while the detainee is housed in a 
public institution and until his future Htat us is d<•terruined ." 478 F . Supp., 
at 1055. 
11 The Dit;trict Court uoted that a person's mental health prob~em , 
especially one that has led to institutionalization, io likely to "'bear r a] 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to ~ociety.'" !d .. at 10.51-
1052, quoting FrpntiPro v. Richardson, 411 U S. 677, 68() (1973). The 
court a1~o arknowledged that "[i]t is ddlfltable whether and to w14at 
'. 
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the mentally ill were "a politically impotent, insular minority'' 
that "have been subject to a 'history of unequal protection.' " 
1b,id. The court therefore concluded that Congress could 
legislatively disfavor the mentally ·m, as § 1611 (e) did, only 
if the statutory classification passes an · "intermediate level of 
judicial scrutiny," id., at 1053, that is, only if the "classifica-
tion bears a substantial relation" to the object of the legisla-
tion evaluated "in.1ight of the primary purpose" of the scheme 
o.f which it is a part. Ibid. The court a·djudged that the 
"primary purpose" of the small monthly stipend was to 
enable the needy to purchase comfort items not provided by 
the institution. "·Rejecting the Secretary's proposed justifica-
tions for the exclusion,12 the District Court held that the 
classification could not withstand scrutiny. ·The legislative 
history, it said, revealed no intent to exclude appellees' class; 
the court could conceive of no upossible unexpreEsed purpose 
for the exclusion"; and the court reasoned that "aged, blind 
and disabled inmates of all public institutions would have 
similar needs." Ibid. Upon the Secretary's direct appea1 




'fhe equal protection obligation impo8ed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendmeu t is uot an obligation to provide 
the best governance possible. This is a necessa.ry result of 
differe11t institutional competences, and its reasons are obvi-
extent the mental illness is an 'innnutable chara.cteristic determined solely 
by the accident of birth.) )j 478 .F. Supp ., at 1052, again quoting Fron-
tie1'0, 411 U. S., at, 6'86'. 
12 The Secretary argued that the statutory exclu:;iou has thn·e purposes: 
" 1) the cont~ervation of federal resource::; ; 2) the concern that federal funds 
be received on behalf of residents of qualified institutions; and 3) the fact 
that plaintiffs a.re not 'similarly situated' with Medicaid patients in tet:.tW3 
of fc®ral intereSt i\Jld control." 478 F. SttJ.JIJ.1 ut 105.). 
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ous. Unless a statute employs a classificatiori that is; i1~h~r­
e11tly invidious or that impinges on fuudame11ta1 rights, are,as 
in which the judiciary then has a duty to interv~ne \n the. 
democratic process, this Court properly exercises only, a li,mit:eu 
1-eview power over Congress. the appropriate repre~en ta~!v~." 
body through which the public makes democratic choice;:;., 
among alternative solutions to social and economic problems._. 
See San Antonio School Di.strict v. Rodrig-uez, 411 U. S. 1 
(1973). At the minimum level, this Court cousistently has 
required -that legislation classify the persous it affects in a 
manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objec-
tives. See, e. g., Dandridge v. Wilfiams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); 
Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976). Appeliees assert 
that the particular graut of federal beuefits under review 
here, however. should "be subjected to a heightened standard 
of review," Brief for Appellees 39, because the mentally .ill 
"historically have been subjected to purposeful uuequar treat-
ment; they have been relegated· to a position of political 
powerlessness; and prejudice against them curtails their par-
ticipation iu the pluralist system and strips theui ()f political 
protection agaiust discriminatory legislation." (Footnote 
omitted:) ra., at 41: . 
We have 110 ocasion to reach this issue b~cause we -conclude 
that this statute does not classify directly. on the basis of 
mental healthY The SSI prograiri disti11guish.es an}ong .three 
groups of persous, all of whom meet the basic eligibility re-
quiremeuts. Persons 110t iu a "public institution" may re-
ceive full benefits; persons in a "public institutio11" of a cer-
tain nature ("hospital, extended care facility, nursing home, 
or intermediate care facility receiving ')Jaymeuts (with reS'pect 
to s·uch individual) . . . under [Medicaid]" ( empl1asis 
added)', '§ 1611 (e) (1) (B) may receive rt>duced benefits; aud 
13 We therefor£> intimate no vil'W H<> lo what ~1awlard of review applies 
t.n1 lt-gHl[t:ion .Cxprrt>sly ~lfa,.::sifying -tlw mruHtlly ill al:. n discrete· group, • 
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persons in any other "publie institution" may not receive any 
beuefits, The statute does not isolate the mentally ill or 
subject them, as a discrete group, to special or subordihate 
treatment. At the most, this legislation incidentally denies 
a smalJ monthly comfort benefit to a certain number of per-
sons suffering from mental illness; but in so doing it imposes 
equivalent deprivation on other groups who -are not mentally 
ill, while at the same tiwe benefiting substantial numbers 
of the mentally ill. 
'rhe group thus singled out for special treatment by § 1911 
(e) does not entirely exclude the menta1ly ill. In fact, it 
includes, in a sizable proportion to the total population re-
ceiving SSI benefits, large numbers of menta1ly i11 people.' 1 
Further, the group excluded is not congruent with appellees> 
14 Social Secmity Admini::;trution statistics show tha.t 30.7% of all blind 
and disabled a.dult personl:l awa.rded SSI benefits in 1975 ( 109,509 per'l:lons) 
were deemed dhlt1hled by meutal di::;orders, and t11e Adminitltration has con-
rluded that "rmJental illnetltl was the most. common cause of diHability 
in 1975 ., Koehhar; Blind and DisalJJea Pet'l:lons Awarded Federally Ad-
ministered SSI P<Lyment::;, 1975, Social Security Bulletin 10, 15 (June 
1979). Half of thitl number ::;ulfered from mental illue::;,.; rather than men-
tal retardation, and these ::~tatibtic::; did not incluue any pcrl:lons with prior 
E>ntitlernent to benefits. Ibid. 
Funher, as a recent study also 'indicates, a. substantial number of men-
tally ill people in in:>titutions actually receive SSI benE>fits. Represen ta-
ive Puymeut:; under the SSI Program, Augul:lt, 1977, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Hesearch and Statil:ltic::; Note No. 9, Septemuer 16, 1980. 
Thi::> ~tud) established tb<et 15% of tlw total population receiving SSI 
Lenefitl:l (for all real:lons, inc1uding age, bliudue::;s, und disability) had 
"repre::~entatiw payees" (a pen;on "appointed to malluge the benefit,; of !Ul 
adult beneficiary" because of ''tl1e adult beueficiary'b inability to manage 
hi::; own fund,.;" ) . ld., at 1. Out of a total of 184,103 institutionalized 
persons who were reeeiving SSI benefits in August 11Y77 thro11gh ~'Uch 
"repre~enta.tive payee::~," 76,494. or approximately 41%, were institu1.ion-
aJized beca.u;,;e of mental disorderl:l. !d., al 7 (Table 6) a11d 2 (Table 1) . 
Tim::~, even on thb incomplete Jata, a ::;izaLle numurr of prrtlent SSI 
rcripiet1ts were person;; in~titutionalized for meutnl iUue::;s. 
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class. Among those excluded are the inmates of any other 
nonmedical "public institution," such as a pris011, other penal 
institution, and any other publicly funded residential program 
the State may operate; 15 persons residing in a tuberculosis 
institution; and residents of a medical institution not certified 
as a Medicaid provider.10 Although not by the same sub-
section, Congress also chose to excludP. from SSI eligibility 
persons afflicted with alcoholism or drug addiction and not 
undergoing treatment, § 1611 (e)(3)(A), and persons who 
speud more than a specified time outside the United States, 
§ 1611 (f). See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978) 
(upholding constitutionality of§ 1611 (f); Califano v. Torres, 
435 U. S. 1 (1978) (upholding constitutiomi1ity of Congress' 
exclusion from SSI eligibility of residents of Puerto Rico). 
Thus, in § 1611 (e), Congress maae a distinction uot between 
the mentaJly ill and a group composea of nomnentally ill, but 
between residents in public institutions receiving Medicaid 
funds for their care and residents in such institutions not 
receiving Medicaid funds. 
To the extent that the statute has an indirect impact upon 
the mentally ill as a subset of publicly institutioualized per-
sons, this record certainly presents no statistical support for a 
contention that the mentally ill as a class are burdened dis· 
proportionately to any other class affected by the Classification. 
'The exclusion draws a line only between groups composed 
(in part) of mentally ill individuals: those in public mental 
hospitals, and those Hot in public mental hospitals. These 
15 Appellees appear to concede the l'Mtionality of Congre:;.':>' general ex-
clusion of ]mullcly in:;titutionalized per:>on:; from full SSI benefits. 
10 An otherwi:;e t'ligible person does not. receive SSI benefits if he ·is 
receiviug long-term tr<,atmt'nt in a medical facility that. i::~ not certified 
nuder Mrdicaid standard:; as a providt'r SPe § 18()1 of the Act, 42 
U. S C. § 1395x These ~Stnct ~Standarlis exclude many facilities but work 
to the ultimate benefit of tho:;e receiving Medicaid Cf. O'Bamwn v. 'l'ow.n 
'Court Nursing Cenla, - U. S. - (1980) , 
79- 1380-0PINION 
.112 HARRIS v. WILSON 
groups are shirt,ing in population, anu members of one group 
can, aud often do, pass to the other g;roup.17 
We also note that appellees have failed to produce any 
evidence that C.ong,ress had a deliberate intent to uiscriminate 
agaiust the mentally ill. Appellees admit that no such evi-
dence exists; i11deed, they rely on the absence of explicit 
iutent as proof of Congress' "inattention" to their needs and, 
therefore, its prejudice against them. Brief for Appellees 39. 
As in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). the indirect 
deprivation worked by this legislation upon appellees' class, 
whether or not the Class is considered "suspect." does not with-
out more move us to ·regard it with a heightened scrutiny. 
Cf. Personnel Ad,miniStrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
u. s. 256 (1979). 
17 The average inpatient stay in public mental hospita.ls ·is sl10rt. Rc~ 
cently collected data for 1975 reveals an average t-:ta.y in sta.tr ami couuty 
mental hospital~ of only 25.5 days. Witkin, Chamcteti&1ics of Adrni::;t;ions 
to SelecteU M<•utal Health Facilities, 1975: An Anno1a1ed Book of Charts 
and Tables, Naliohal Institute of Mental HraHh -, DHHS Publication 
No. (ADM) 80-l005 (1981). This study alHo showed that. young and 
elderly patfents had longer periods of stay Oum patien~s in tlw mi<ldle-age 
group. Id., at - . The ra,pidity with whicl1 inpatiPnf::; ar<' rele~;;ed from 
public institutions has increased ::;ine~· the 1950's. Tn 1971 75% of all 
patients admit.ted to state mental hospitnl:;: werr released within the fir~t 
three month:::., while 87% were released within th!' fit"Bt six months. Ozarin, 
Uedick, & Taube, A Quarter Century of Psychiatric Care, 1950-1974: A 
Stati:stical Review, 27 Hospital & Communi1~· Psyehia.try 516 (1976) . 
Data from the National Institute of M<·nta1 Health show that tlw propor-
tion of "pu.tieut care episode~" (admi::;t;ions duriug n. ~·<'Hr plus residrnts 
at the beginning of the year) attributable to iupatimt treatment n.t state 
and county hospitals declitwd from 49% iu 1!:!55 to 9% in 1977. This 
dram~ttir decrease in the percentage of person:-: admi11E·d 1o t.lll'::w hospital.... 
was paralleled by a growth in t.n•atmcnt through outpatient and commu-
nity menta.! health h<'ihti~; that. pt>rcmtugl' grl'w from 23% in 1955 to 
76% in 1977. Witkin, Trendt-: in Ptttienl Care Episode:; in MmtaJ He.<llth 
Facihties, 1955-IH77, National Institute of Mcn1<tl Health, Mmtal H!•alth 
Statistical Note 1'\o. 154, p . 3 (Septemlx•t' Hl80). At 1he same time, the 
total number of "patient ca.rP episode~" incr!'<lscd fomfold, from approxi-
mately 1.7million in 1955 to li 9 million ju 1V77. Id., al L 
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Thus, the pertiuent inquiry js whether the classification 
employed in § 1611 (e)(1 )(B) advauces legitimate legislative 
goals in a rational fashion. The Court has said that, although 
this rational basis standard is "uot a toothless oue," Mat hews 
v. L-ucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510 (1976), it does not allow us to 
substitute our personal notions of good public policy for those 
of Congress: 
"In the ·area of economics and social welfare, a State 
[and correspondingly under the Fifth Amendment the 
Federa1 Government] does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause merely because the classifications made by its 
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reason-
able basis,' it does not offend the Coustitution simply 
because the classification 'is not made with mathematical 
nicety or because in practice it results iu some inequity.' 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970). 
The Court also has said: "This inquiry employs a relatively 
relaxed standard refl.ecti11g the Court's awareness that the 
drawing of lines that create distinction~ is peculiarly a legisla .. 
tive task and an unavoitlable one. Per(ection in making the 
necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary." 
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v . . Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 
314 (1976). See also Un-ited States Ra·ilroad Retirement Bd. 
v. Fr·itz, - U. S. - (1980). As long as the classificatory 
scheme chosen by Congress rationally advances a reasonable 
and identifiable governmental objective, we must disregard 
the existence of other methods of allocatiOn that we, as in-
dividuals, perhaps would have erred. 
We believe that the decision to incorporate the Medicaid 
eligibility standards into the SSl scheme must be considered 
Congress' deliberate, cousidered choice. The legislative rec-
ord, .although sparse, appears to he unequivocal. )3oth Hoy~e 
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and Senate Reports on the iuitial SSI bill noted the exclusion 
in uo uncertain terms. The House Report stated~ 
"People ~ho are reside1'1ts of certain public institutions, 
or hospitals or nursing homes which are getting Medicaid 
funds, wo~ld get ~enefits of up to $25 a mouth (reduced 
by nonexcluded income). For these people most sub-
sistence needs are met by the iustitution and full bene-
fits are not needed. '- ome payrnent to these people, 
though, would be needed to enable them to purchase 
small comfort items not supplied by the institution. No 
assistance benefits will be paid to an individual iu a penal 
institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971 ). 
The Senate Report followed the House's language almost iden-
tically. See S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). We find 
these passages, at the very least, to be a clear expression of 
Congress' understanding that the stipend grant was to be 
limited to a group smaller than the total population of other-
wise eligible, institutionalized people. 'rhat the bill's sec-
tiou-by-sectioll analysis contained in the House Report laid 
out the terms of the exclusion precisely supports the conclu-
sion that Congress was aware of who was inc u e< 111 t a 
limited group. See H. R. Rep. I~o. 92-231, at 334. 
The limited nature of MedicaH.I eligibility did uot pass 
unnoticed by the Pnacting Congress. In thP same bill that 
established the SST program. C',ongrf'ss considered, and passed, 
an amendment to Medicaid, providing coverag<' of inpatient 
services to a large number of tlw j u veni1e ueedy in public 
meutal institutions. 18 ~ee § 1905 (h) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. 
18 To hl' digibl<~ for ~[r(hcmd !'('Ullbur~Pmeut for mpat]('nt services, men-
tally ill JWI'tion,: under the age of 21 h<~mg tn·afl'd in lllt'Jltal institutions 
mu:;t be rere1vi11~ '·active trc•atmmt" that lll('et::; :;taudard~ pn~cribed by 
the S(•Cretary and that ''can ren~onnhly hl' exp<•eted to nnvrove the eoudi-
tion 'by T<'a.-:o11 of whieh ::;uch H(•rvice:; :He lH'('t':;sary to I he exteut that 
eventually :such :service:> will no longer be npee:-._"Hf) " § 1905 (h)(l)(B) 
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§ 1396<1 (h); S. Rep. No. 92- 1230. pp. 280- 281; H. R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 92- 1605, p. 65. Also, a Senate proposal for demon-
stratiou projects on the feasibility of extending Medicaid to 
cover all inpatient services provided in public mental institu-
tions was simultaneously defeated. See S. Rep. No. 92-1230, 
p. 281; H. R. Couf. Rep. No. 92- 1605, p. 65. Congress was 
in the process of considering the wisdom of these limitations 
at the time it chose to incorporate them into the SSI provi-
sions. 'rhe decision to do so did not escape controversy. The 
Committee hearings contained testimony advocating extension 
of both Medicaid and SSI benefits to all needy residents in 
public mental institutions. See Social Security Amendments 
of 1971, Hearings on H. R. 1 before the Senat~· Committee 
on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 2180, 2408-2410, 
2479-2485, 3257, 3319 (1972). This legislative history shows 
that Congress was aware, when it added § 1611 (e) to the 
Act, of the limitations in the Medicaid program that would 
restrict eligibility for the reduced SSI benefits; we decline to 
regard such deliberate action as the result of inadvertence 
or ignorance. See Maine v. Thiboutot,- U. S. - (1980) 
(slip op. 6). 
Having found the adoption of the Medicaid standards in-
tentional, we deem it logical to infer from Congress' deliberate 
action an intent to further the same subsidiary purpose that 
lies behind the Medicaid exclusion, which, as no party denies, 
was adopted because Congress believed the States to have a 
"traditional" responsibility to care for those institutionalized 
in public mental institutions.10 The Secretary, emphasizing 
10 The Medicaid limitation was based on CongrE>s:s' assumption that the 
care of persons in public mental in:stitntiom; was properly a responsibility 
of the Stut es. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Coug., 1st Se;.~., 42 (1949) 
(t:Jnacting federal funding for services to the needy aged, blind, and dis-
Slbled provided in public medical institutions, hut excluding assistance to 
those in "public or prlva.te institution,; for mental lllness und tuberculosis, 
since the States have gem•rally provided for tn('dieal care of such cases"); 
S. llep. No. 404, 89th Coug., l:st Ses;., pt. 1, 144-1-!7 (1965) (enactlnent 
79-l380-0PINION 
16 HARHIS v. WILSON 
the then existing congressional desire to economize in the dis~ 
bursement of federal funds, argues that the decision to limit 
distribution of the monthly stipend to inmates of pu:;:b:;:.li:;;c-'i;:n=---L...~ 
stitutions who are receiving Medicaid funds "" rationally 
related to the legitimate legislative desire to avoid spending 
federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and 
treatment are being fully provided for by state and local 
government units" and "rnay be said to implement a congres-
sional policy choice to provide supplemental financial assist-
ance for only those "residents of public institutions who already 
receive significant federal support in the form of Medicaid 
coverage." Brief for Appellant 27-28. We cannot say that 
the belief that the States should continue to have the primary 
responsibility for making this small "comfort money" allow-
ance available to those res:ding in state-run institutions is au 
irrational basis for withholding from them federal general 
welfare funds.20 
Although we understand and are inclined to be sympathetic 
with appellees' and their supporting amici's asEertions as to 
the beneficial effects of a patienes receiving the reduced stip-
end, we find this a legislative, and JJot a legal, argument. 
Congress rationally may elect to shoulder only part of the 
burden of supplying this allowance, and may rationally limit 
the grant to Medicaid recipients, for whose care the Federal 
of Medicaid providing coverage only to the aged net>dy in mental or 
tuberculosi::> institutions; 11oting that " [tJhr reason for this exclusion was 
tpat long-ter?J care in such hospital::; had traditionaJiy been accepted as a 
responsibility of the States,n id., u.t 144) . This exclusion was upheld in 
L~gion v. Richardson, 354 1<' . Supp. 45i'i (Sb:NY), ai'ed s·ub nom. Legion v. 
Weinberger, 414 U.S 1058 (197a), and Kautrowitz v. Weinberger, 388 F. 
Supp. 1127 (DC 1974), aff 'd, 174 U. S. App, D. C. 182, 530 F . 2d 1034, 
cert. denied, 429 U. S. 81() (1976), and appellees di::;avow any intention 
to dis}'lute that holding. 'Brief for Appellees 26-27 ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. 
20 Whether a State choo:;e:; to elect or not to elect to provide an 
equivalent monthly :;tipend to institutionalizrd mental patients does Mt 
alt~t th~ l"ationallty of Contl'e&~) d~ciJoh. 
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Government already has assumed the major portion of the 
.expeuse.21 1'he limited gratuity represents a partial solution 
to a far more general problem, ~2 and Congress legitimately 
may assume that the States would, or should, provide an 
equivalent, either in funds or in basic care. See Baur v. 
Mathews, 578 F . 2d 228, 233 (CA9 1978). This Court has 
granted a "strong presumption of constitutionality" to legisla-
tion confening monetary benefits, Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 
U. S., at 185, because it believes that Congress should have 
discretion in decidillg how to expend necessarily limitetl re-
sources. Awarding this type of benefits inevitably involves 
the kind of line-drawing that will leave some comparably 
needy person outside the favored circfe.23 We cannot say 
that it was irt·ational of Congress, in view of budgPtary con-
21 The Secretary has interpreted § 1611 (e) (1) (B) to require that at 
least 50% of tht> cost of .services be reimbursed by Medieaid brfore tho 
l'eduction of beneqlB oecome' effective. ZO CFR § 416~231 (b) (5) (1980). 
22 Congress continues to investigate other more grneral solutions and 
to propose alterations in P611 (e). See H. R. Rep. No. 9&-451, pt. 1, 
p. 153 (1979); 125 Cong :Rec. H10301, H10306, E5526 (d::tily rds. Nov. 7 
and 9, 1979) (remarKs of Rep. Corman, Rep. PepJ'>er, and Hep Bingham) 
(proposing amendment to § 1611 (e) to fore;;rtall reduction of benefits until 
after eligible individual has been institutionalized in u. Meuicaid in&1itntion 
for t.hree mont.hs); Staff of the Senate Committee on FinHJICe, The Sup-
plemental Security Income Program, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 109-115 
(Comm. Print 1977) (advocating legislative amendments standardizing tho 
monthly stipend to institutionalized person,;). 
28 "When a legal ui:;tinction i.s determint>d, as no one doubt.-, that. it may 
he, between night and day, childhood . and matnrity, or any othPr ex-
tremes, a point has to be fixrd or a line lms to br drawn, or gradually 
picked out by succe.,;.,;ive decisions, to mark where the changP titk~ place. 
Looked at by itself without, regard t-o the necessity behind it the line or 
point SC('ms arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as wrll be a little more 
to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a, line or point. there 
must he, and t.hat there is no mathematical or logical wny of fixing it 
precisl:'ly, Uw <lecision of the legi,;lature mu.st be accepted unless we can 
say tha.t it is very wide of auy rea:sonable mark." Loui.sville Gas Co. v. 
Co!elflmn, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (19:.?8) (Holme,;, J., dissenting) . 
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straints/4 to decide that it is the Medicaid recipients in public 
institutions that are the most needy and the most deserving 
of the small monthly supplement. See, e. g., Califano v. 
Boles, 443 U.S. 28~, ~96 0979); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 
47, 53 (1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770 
(1975); Richard v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971). 
We conclude that Congress did not violate appellees' rights 
to equal protection by denying them the supplementary 
benefit. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. 
It is so ord~red, 
m, ...... :::::u: --
24 The amount of money, and the number of people potentially involved, 
are not inconsiderable. Although the appellees do not agree, the Secretary 
estimates that the annual cost of implementing the District Court's order 
nationwide would ~pproximate ~30 million. Memorandum in Reply to 
Appellees' Motion to Affirm 3. In 1979, a total of almost 2.2 million 
people were receiving ssr benefits for disabilities, an increase of over 
900,000 from January 19H. See Social Security Bulletin 49· (Table M-24) 
(June 1979). Further, of all the disabled adults whp applied for benefits 
between January 1974 and July 1975, 1.1% were denied eligibility by 
reason of their re::;idence in a public im;titution . SeeS. Rep. No. 95-13121 
p. 7 (table) (1978) . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1380 
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, On Appeal from the United 
Appellant, States District Court for 
the Northern District of v. 
Charles Edward Wilson et al. 
Illinois. 
[February -, 1981] 
JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a 
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible peo-
ple solely because previously it rationally denied them Medic-
aid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied 
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals 
of one welfare program to another welfare program serving 
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly 
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no gov-
ernment interest. This irrational classification violates the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
The Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) is a 
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare ben-
efits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1381-1382. See generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 
U.S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) of the Act, 
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e) (1) (A), operates to reduce substan-
tially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to other-
wise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. The 
reason for this reduction of benefits is understandable: 
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the 
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
2 
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable 
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by 
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231 , p. 150 (1971). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort 
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the 
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that 
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611 
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an 
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he 
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program. 
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness, 
and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42 
U.S. C. §§ 1382c (3)(A) , (C). As residents of public men-
tal institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, they 
are ineligible to .receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment. 
!d., § 1905 (a)(17) (B). For this reason, and none other, ap-
pellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI payments 
available to inmates of other medical institutions, including 
patients in public medical hospitals and private mental 
institutions.1 
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institu-
tions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal 
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354 
1 Other classes of institut ionalized people denird the reduced SSI allow-
ance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison inmat es. The 
Court too quickly dispatches the argument that § 1611 (e) claEsifies on 
the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not all menta.!Iy ill people 
are denied the benefit, and that some people denied the benefit are not 
mentally ill, it is inescapable that appellees are denied the benefit because 
they are patients in mental institutions. Only the mentally ill are treated 
in mental ins titutions. While I would agree that there is no indication 
that Congress intended to punish or slight the mentally ill, the history 
of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' special concern with methods of treat-
ing mental illness. See, infra, at - . Because I find the classification 
irrational, I do not reach the question whether clas,;ifications drawn in 
pa~t on the basis of mental health require heightened scrutiny. 
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F. Supp. 459 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 
414 U. S. 1058 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused 
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L. 
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554, 
557 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have ex-
tended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in 
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42 
U.S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and to 
treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and over 65 
in a state public mental institution, id., §§ 1396 (d)(a)(14), 
(17)(B). Moreover, Congress has defined "public institu-
tion" not to include a publicly operated community residence 
center serving no more than 16 residents. /d., § 1382 (e)(1) 
(C). Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to 
the mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The re-
sidual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally 
ill from federal financial assistance rests on two related prin-
ciples: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of ad-
ministering this form of care, and the federal government 
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of 
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h) 
(1)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treat-
ment in mental institutions only when standards of utility 
are met). 
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why 
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coex-
tensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments.2 The 
2 The only indication of Congressional intent states: "No assistance 
benefits will be paid to an individual in a penal institution." H. R. Rep. 
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). If Congress intended § 1611 (e) to exclude 
prison inmates, the classification would be irrationally overinclusive. A 
mental hospital is not a penal institution. Neither the Secretary nor the 
Court argues that the exclusion of appellees from the comfort allowance 
rationally furthers this purpose. 
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Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con-
cluded that the States have the primary responsibility for 
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because 
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treat-
ment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justifica-
tion, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or 
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental in-
stitutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' sup-
posed judgment. Ante, at 16, n. 20. 
II 
A 
Social and economic legislation that does not employ sus-
pect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must 
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpose. Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, - U. S. - (1980). San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stated test 
holds two firmly established principles in tension. The Court 
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy 
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people, 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra, 
at 486, but the equal protection requirement does place a 
substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular 
classes of citizens. E. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 
374-375 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 
(1972). Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwar-
ranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult 
task. No bright line divides the merely foolish from the 
arbitrary law.8 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-
3 The Court has employed numerous formulations for the "rational 
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong 
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce ben-
efits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful, 
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 
U. S. 181, 185 (1976). 
The deference to which legislative accommodation of con-
flicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle 
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re~ 
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an impor-
tant touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how 
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature in-
tended to serve. See, e. g., U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears 
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme 
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has 
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system re-
quires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose 
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae, 
- U. S. - (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479 
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the 
question of whether a statutory classification is arbitrary can-
not be divorced from whether it was enacted to Eerve an 
actual purpose. When a legislative purpose can be suggested 
only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the 
constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing court may be pre~ 
sented not so much with a legislative policy choice as its 
absence.4 
basis" test. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,- U. S. -, -, -, 
n. 10 (1980). Members of the Court continue to hold divergent views on 
the clarity with which a legislative purpo ·e must appear. See id., at -
(STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at - (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and 
about the degree of deferrence afforded the legislature in &"Uiting means to 
ends, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 
(1911), with Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
4 Congress' failure to make policy judgments can distort our system of 
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism 
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported 
by the legislative history.5 When no indication of legislative 
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secre-
tary, the Court should require that the classification bear a 
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This 
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test 
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal 
protection review as something more than "a mere tauto-
logical recognition of the fact that Congress did what it in-
tended to do." Fritz, supra, at 462 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
B 
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history 
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to 
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As 
noted above, the only arguable purpose identified in the 
House and Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving 
inmates of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. 
The structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose 
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially 
legislative decisions. See Cannon v. University of Virginia, 441 U. S. 
677, 743 (1979) (POWELL, J., di~enting). 
5 Some of our cases suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is 
irrelevant, Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960), and that the 
statute must be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify" its dis~rimination, McGowan v. Ma1'yiand, 366 U. S. 
420, 426 (1961) Altbough these cases preserve an important caution, 
they do not d~s~ribc the importance of actual legislative purpose in our 
analysis. We recognize that a legislative body rarely acts with a single 
mind and that compromises blur purpcse. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to accord some deference to the executive's view of legislative intent, as 
similarly we accord deference to the consistent construction of a statute 
by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement. E. g., Udall 
v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). Ascertainment of actua.l purpose to 
the extent feasible, however, remains our e<:iSential goal. 
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because § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of 
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani-
cally applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress 
appears to have avoided considering 'vhat criteria would be 
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a per-
son can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. 
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to 
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions 
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A. 
v. Murray, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti, 
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979). 
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the ex-
clusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of in-
dividuals whose care and treatment are being fully provided 
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appel-
lant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not 
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes 
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees 
because they were thought to be less needy." Brief, at 32.0 
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides 
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental 
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a com-
fort allowance. Indeed, no State will be more likely to pay 
a patient a comfort allowance because the federal govern-
ment refused to relieve it of part of the cost of the patient's 
medical care. The Court apparently recognizes this, as it 
states that whether or not a State actually provides a com-
fort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Appellees 
simply are denied a benefit provided to other institutional-
ized, disabled patients. 
0 This concession makes it clifficult to accept the Court's conclusion that 
Congress rationally could have decided that "Medicaid recipients in public 
institutions ... are the most needy and the most deserving of the small 
monthly supplement." Ante, at 18. 
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could make the judg-
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any 
comfort allowance, because they already have the respop.si-
bility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is 
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities. 
See U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Residence 
in a mental hospital is rationallv related to whether the Con-
ll;ress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion v. 
Richardson. 354 F. Supp. 459 (SDNY). a:ff'd, sub nom. Le-
gion v. Weinberqer, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment 
whether the federal government should subsidize care for 
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult 
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at -. 
But. residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to 
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hos-
pital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program. 
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal exoenses, 
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medic-
aid or "other programs." H. R. ReD. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1), 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash bene-
fit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and 
mediral care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Fed-
eral Government is paying for the maintenance and medical 
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood 
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same. 
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refus-
ing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee. while paying it 
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents. 
This difference in treatment must have been a legislative 
oversight. I therefore dissent. 
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a 
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible peo-
ple solely because previously it rationally denied them Medic-
aid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied 
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals 
of one welfare prograin to another welfare program serving 
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly 
dei:>endent people from minimal benefits, serving no gov-
ernment interest. This irrational classification violates the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
The Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) is a 
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare ben-
efits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1381-1382. See generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 
U. S. 170, 171 (1978) . Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) of the Act, 
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e) (1)(A), operates to reduce substan-
tially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to other-
wise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. The 
reason for this reduction of benefits is understandable: 
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the 
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
7 
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable 
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by 
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971). 
~ee also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort 
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the 
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that 
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611 
(e)(1)(B) . Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an 
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he 
·receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program. 
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness, 
·and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (3)(A). (C). As residents of public men-
tal institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, they 
are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment. 
Id., § 1905 (a)(17)(B).1 For this reason, and none other, ap-
pellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI payments 
available to inmates of other medical institutions, including 
patients in public medical hospitals and private mental 
institutions.~ 
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institu-
tions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal 
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354 
1 Other clas:;es of in~titutionalized proplr denird the reduced SSI ullow-
I.Ilce include patients in tubercular institution<! and prison inmates. 
2 The Court too quickly dispatches the argument that. § 1611 (e) clu~Ssi­
fies on the basis of mental illne::;s . While it is true that not. all mentally 
ill people are denied thr benefit, and that. some people denied the benefit 
are not mentally ill, it is ine::;ca,pable that appellees are denied the benefit 
because they are patirnts in mental institutions. Only the menta.lly ill 
are treated in mrntal in~titutions . While I would agree that there is no 
indication that Congress intended to punish or slight the mentally ill, the 
history of Medicaid demonstrat{'S Congress' dit>inclination to involve the 
federal government in l:itftte t.rcatment. of mental illness in public institu-
tions. See, infra, at. -. Because I find the classification irrational, 1 
do not reaeh the question whether classificat.ions drawn in part. on thEt 
basis of mental health require heightened scrutiny as appellees ::>uggest. 
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F. Supp. 459 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 
4.14 U. S. 1058 (1973) . Initially, Congress broadly refused 
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L. 
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a) , 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554, 
557 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have ex-
tended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in 
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and to 
treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and over 65 
in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396 (d)(a)(14), (17) 
(B) . Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" 
not to include a publicly operated community residence cen-
ter serving no more than 16 residents. !d., at § 1382 (e)(1) 
(C). Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to 
the mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The re-
sidual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally 
ill from federal financial assistance rests on two related prin-
ciples: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of ad-
ministering this form of care, and the federal government 
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of 
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h) 
(l)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treat-
ment in mental institutions only when standards of utility 
are met). 
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why 
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coex-
tensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments.3 The 
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con .. 
3 The only indication of Congressional intent stater,: "No assistance 
benefits will be paid to an individtu~l m a pena.l mstitution." H. R. Rep, 
No. 92-231, 150 (1971) . A mentill. ho~pitlli is not a penal institution, 
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argue::; that the exclu::;ion of appell~ 
from the comfort allowance rationally furthen, thi::; purpose. 
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eluded that the States have the primary responsibility for 
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because 
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treat-
ment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justifica-
tion, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or 
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental in-
stitutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' sup-
posed judgment. Ante, at 16, n. 20. 
II 
A 
Social and economic legislation that does not employ sus-
pect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must 
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpose. Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz,-· -U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio School 
Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stated test 
holds two firmly established principles in tension. The Court 
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy 
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people, 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U~ S. 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra, 
at 486, but the equal protection requirement does place a 
substantive limit on legislative pDwer. At a minimum, the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular 
classes of citizens. E. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 
374-375 (1974); James v. Strange, 4071J. S. 128, 140 (1972); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 
(1972) . Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwar-
ranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult 
task. No bright hne divides the merely foolish from the 
arbitrary law.4 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-
~The Court ha:; employed numerous formulations for the "rationaf 
basis" tf'"t .. Railroad Retirement Board v. Pritz,- U.S.-,-,-.,. 
• 
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong 
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce ben-
efits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful, 
but Ullavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 
u. s. 181, 185 (1976) . 
The deference to which legislative accommodation of con-
flicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle 
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re-
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an impor-
tant touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how 
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature in-
tended to serve. See, e. g., U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinn·is v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 
270 (1973) . When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears 
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme 
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has 
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system re-
quires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose 
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae, 
- U. S. - (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479 
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the 
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates 
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted 
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose 
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government law-
yer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing 
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy 
choice as its absence.5 
n. 10 (1980) . MernbertJ of the Court continue to hold divergent views on 
the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear. See id., at -
(S•rEVENI:l, J ., concurring); id ., at - (BRENNAN, J., ditJSenting), and 
about the degree of deferrence afforded the legislature in :>'Uiting means to 
E"ndtJ, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 
(1911), with Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
5 Congres::;' fa!lure to make policy judgments can distort our system or 
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially 
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism 
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported 
by the legislative history.fl When no indication of legislative 
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secre-
tary, the Court should require that the classification bear a 
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This 
marginally more demanding sm:utiny indirectly would test 
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal 
protection review as something more than "a mere tauto-
logical recognition of the fact that Congress did what it in~ 
tended to do,'' Fritz, supra, at 462 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting) . 
B 
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history 
identifies or even suggests a.ny policy plausibly intended to 
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As 
noted above, the only purpose identified iu the House aiid 
Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates 
of penal im:titutious of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The 
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose be-
legislativt> decision~> . See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
743 (197!:) (POWELL, J., (h:;sentirg). 
"Some of our case;, ~uggest that the actual purpose of a ::;tatute i:; 
irrelevant, Fleming v Nestor, ;363 l' S. 603, 612 (1960), and that the· 
,;;tatute mu:;t be upheld "if any :;tate of fact :; rPa::;onably may be con-
ceived to JUstify" it:; discrimination, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 
420, 426 (1961) Although the:;e case::; pre:;erve an important caution, 
tbey do not d:s~nbc the importance of actual legislative purpo:;e in our 
analy:;is. We recognize that a legi:;lative body rarely act::; with a single 
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it IS appropriate· 
to accord ::;orne dcfcrenC'e to the executive'::; view of legi::;lative intent, as 
~imilarly wp accord deference to the con~istent con~>iruction of a :;tatute 
hy the admim:;trative agenc) charged with it~ enforcement. E . (J., Udall' 
v. Tallman, 380 U. S 1, 16 (1965). A:;certainment of actual purpose to 
the extent feusible, however, remaius an e::;sential ~tep in equal protection_ 
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cause ~ lti 11 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of 
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani-
cally applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress 
appears to have avoided considering what criteria would be 
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a per-
son can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. 
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to 
another creates significant risks that irratiOnal distinctions 
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A. 
V, Murray, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti, 
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979) . 
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the ex-
clusion "1s rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
desire to avoid spending federal resources ou behalf of in-
dividuals whoEe care and treatment are being fully provided 
for by state aud local government units." Brief for Appel-
lant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not 
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes 
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees 
becal'se they were thought to be less needy." !d., at 32.7 
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides 
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental 
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a com-
fort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay 
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the 
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of 
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes 
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides 
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Ap-
pellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institu-
tionalized, disabled patients. 
7 ThiH conce;;sion make~ it difficult to accept the Court's conclusion tha.t 
Congre:s..~ rationally could havE' decided that ·'Medicaid recipients in public 
institution:> ... are the most needy and the most deserving of the small 
monthly :supplemeiJt ." Ante, at 18. 
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could ma.ke the judg~ 
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any 
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsi-
bility for providing treatment and m~nimal care. There is 
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities. 
See U.S. D. A, v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973). Residence 
in a public mental hospital is rationally rela.ted to whether 
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion 
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 459 (SDNY), aff'd. sub nom. Le-
gion v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment 
whether the federal government should subsidize care for 
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult 
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at -. 
But. residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to 
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hos-
pital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program. 
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses, 
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medic-
aid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1), 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash bene-
fit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and 
medi<·al care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Fed-
eral Government is paying for the maintenance and medical 
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood 
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same. 
I conclude that Co11gress had no rational reason for refus-
ing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it 
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents. 
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been ~ 
legislative oversight. I therefore dissent. 
79-1380 Harris 
Dear Harry: 
You have written a fine opinion for the Court. I 
will, however, in accord with my vote at Conference, try my 
hand at a dissent. 
K As I hope to get away for a nearly a week, it will 






To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Peter 
Re: Schweiker v. Wilson, No. 79-1380 
2/14/81 
Please note that Part II, A of this draft probably 
could be reduced to one paragraph if necessary. I undertook to 
analyze the problem of ascertaining legislative purpose because 
of reading Murgia, because this case seemed to present that 
problem, and because you have never stated your rejection of 
McGowan v. Maryland in any published opinion. Although you lost 
in Murgia, the issue lives on, as you know from the separate 
opinions in Railroad Retirement. I would be pleased to explore 
the problem further, or merely drop it and rewrite the draft to 




TO: Peter DATE: Feb. 16, 1981 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Schweicker 
Your first draft, dated 2/10/81, is persuasive. I 
think your Part II is as good any anything I have seen on 
equal protection analysis, and - as I have softened it a bit 
- I will certainly keep it for a Chambers Draft to see 
whether your colleagues challenge it. 
I have dictated some language to be added to 
footnote 5. This may require some further editing. 
Without checking back, my recollection is that we 
use the word "purpose" rather consistently. This is the 
term used in equal protection analysis. I assume it is 
synonymous with "intent" that is used normally in discussing 
interpretation of statutory language. Unless there is some 
distinction not apparent to me, I would like to use the 
words interchangeably. 
• In Part III you identify the inequality that is 
the subject of this case. Without checking back, it seems 
to me that this could be made clearer in Part I, so that the 
reader would have the inequity in mind as we move into Part 
II that addresses the appropriate equal protection analysis. 
For example, when I first looked at this case I wondered how 
a distinction could be made between patients in a public 
mental institution, and patients in a public medical 
hospital, or a private mental institution. I would state 
this consequence of the statute "loudly and clearly" at an 
appropriate place in Part I. 
* * * 
2. 
I would like to move this opinion to a circulation 




JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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Jlzur4htghtn. ~. (!f. 2llb''i~ 
February 20, 1981 
Re: 79-1380 - Schweiker v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR / 
RE: No.79-1380 Harris v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis: 
After studying your dissent once more, I am content. 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
' / 
u~~-o~ 
.invuntt <!faud ttf tlrt ~tb .itzdts 
'llasfringhtn. ~. <!f. 2ll~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Re: No. 79-1380 - Schweiker v. Wil 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
2-26-81 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT}ll 
No. 79-1380 
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of 
l!ealth and Human Services, 
Appellant, 
v. 
~harles Edward Wilson et al. 
JusTICE PoWELL, dissenting. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
· the Northern District Of 
Illinois. 
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied ·a 
amall monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible peo-
·ple solely because previously it rationally denied them Medic-
aid benefits. ln my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied 
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals 
of one welfar~ program to another welfare program serving 
entirely differeht needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly 
~dependent pedple from minimal benefits, serving no gov-
ernmeJ:J.t interest. This irrational classification violates the 
iqual protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) is a 
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare ben-
efits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 86 Stat. 1465, 
42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. See generally Califano v. Azna-
vorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) 
Qf the Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1382 (e)(1)(A). operates to reduce 
aubstantially, to $25 per month. the SSI benefits available to 
6therwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. 
The reason for this reduction of benefit is understandable: 
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the 
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable 
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by 
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort 
allowance is providf'Jd to institution residents only if the 
qualified person resiqes in a public hospital or institution that 
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611 
(e)(l)(B). '.fhus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an 
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he 
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program. 
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness, 
and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (a) (3) (A), (C). As residents of public 
mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, 
they are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treat-
ment. !d., § 1396a (a)(17)(B).1 For this reason, and none 
other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI 
payments available to inmates of other medical institutions, 
including patients in public medical hospitals and private 
mental institutions.2 
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institu-
tions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal 
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354 
1 Other classes of institutionalized people denied the reduced SSI allow-
ance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison imnates. 
1 1.'he Court too quickly dispa.tches the argument that § 1611 (e) cla:ssi-
fies on the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not all mentally 
ill people are denied the benefit, a,nd that some people denied the benefit 
are not mentally ill, it is inescapable that appellees are denied the benefit 
because they are pa,tients in mentaJ inst.itutions. Only the mentally ill 
are treated in mental institutions. While I would agree that there is no· 
indication that Congress intended to pt111ish or slight, the mentally ill, the 
history of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' disinclination to involve the 
federal government in state trea,tment of mental illnes::; in public institu-
tions. See, infra, at -. Because I find the classifica.t.ion irrational, I 
do not. reach the question whether classifications drawn in part on the· 
basis of mental health require 11eighte11ed scrutiuy as avpellees s\1gge!lt,. 
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~. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinoerver, 
·H4 U. S. 1058 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused 
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L. 
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554, 
1>57-558 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have ex-
tended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in 
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), ( 4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), aud 
to treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and over 
tiS in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396d (a) (14), (16 ). 
Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to 
include a publicly operated community residence center serv-
ing no more than 16 residents. ld., at § 1382 (e)(1)(C). 
Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to the 
mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The resid-
ual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally ill 
from federal financial assistance rests ou two related prin-
ciples: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of ad-
ministering this form of care, and the federal government 
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of 
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h) 
(l)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treat-
ment in mental institutions only when standards of utility 
are met). 
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why 
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coex-
tensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments.3 The 
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con-
1 The only indication of Congressional intent states: "No assistance 
benefits will be paid to an individual in t~ penal in~titution." H. R. Rep. 
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A mental hospital is not a penal institution. 
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argues that the exclusion of appellees 
from the comfort allowance rationally furthers this purpose. 
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eluded tl,}a.~ ' the States have the primary responsibility for 
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because 
they already bear the responsibili.ty for paying for their treat-
ment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justifica-
tion, the Court adds that whether the States'do, ever have, or 
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental in-
stitutions is irrelevant to the ' rationality of Congress' sup-
posed judgment. Ante, at i6, n. 20. 
II 
'A 
Social and economic legislation that does not employ sus-
pect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must 
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpoEe. U. S. Railroad Retire-
ment Hoard v. Fritz,- U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio 
School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stat::d test 
holds two firmly established principles in tension . · The Court 
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy 
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people, 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra, 
at 485-486, but the equal protection requirement does place . . 
a substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular 
classes of citizens. E . g., Johnson v. Rob-ison, 415 U. S. 361 , 
374-375 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 140 (1972); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 
(1972). Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwar-
ranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult 
task. No. bright line divides the merely foolish from the 
arbitrary law.4 · Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-
• The Court has employed numerous formulations for the " rational 
basis" telit. U. S. Railroad R etirement Bd. v. Fritz, - U, S. -, - , 
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong 
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce ben-
efits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful, 
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 
u. s. 181, 185 (1976). 
The deference to which legislative accommodation of con-
flicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle 
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re-
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an impor-
tant touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how 
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature in-
tended to serve. See, e. g., U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 
p28, 536-538 ( 1973) ; McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears 
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme 
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has 
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system re-
quires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose 
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae, 
-· U. S. - (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479 
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Yet,' the 
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates 
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted 
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose 
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government law-
yer litigating the constitutionality of a sta.tute, a reviewing 
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy 
choice as its absence.& 
-, n. 10 ( 1980). Members of the Court l'Ontinue to hold divergent 
views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear, see id., 
at - (&rEVEM!, J ., concurring); id., at - (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), 
anJ about the degree of deferrence afforded the .legislature in suiting 
mea11s to end!:!, compare Lindsle'Y v. Nativnal Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 
11, 78-79 (1911 ), with Rayster Guano Co . v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 
(1920). 
3 Congress' failure w make policy judgments can distort our system of 
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to muke essentially 
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In my vi~w, ~he Pourf sht~ulfl peceiye wifh some skepticism 
post hoc hypo~heses abou~ ll;lgi~lp.t1ve purpose, unsupported 
by the legislative history.6 When no inqication of legislative 
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secre-
tary, the Court should require that the classification bear a 
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This 
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test 
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal 
protection review as something more than "a mere tauto-
logical recognition of the fact that Congress did what it in-
tended to do." Fritz, supra, at- (STEVENS, J., concurring). 
:B 
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history 
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to 
be served by denying appellees th~ small SSI allowance. As 
noted above, th~ only purpose identified in the House and 
Senate Reports is the ir'relevant goal of depriving inmates 
of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The 
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose be-
legislative decisions . See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
743 (1979 (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
0 Some of our cases suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is 
irrelevant, Flemming v. Nestor , :363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960), and t,Jmt the 
statute must be upheld "if any state o~- factl:l reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify" iti:i dil:lcrimination, McGowa¥t v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 
420, 426 (1961) .. Ahhough these ea;es preserve in i·rnporta.nt caution, 
they do not d ~s2ribc the importance of actual legislative purpose in our 
analysis. We recognize that .a legil:llative body rarely acts with a single 
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to accord some d~ference to the executive'l:l view of legislative intent, as 
&imilarly we accor.d deference to the con~istent construction of a ~tatute 
by the administrative agency charged with it::; enforcement . E . g., Udall 
v .. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965) . A:scertainment of actual purpose to 
'the e.,tent feasible , however, remains an essential step in eCjllal1h'6tecbon. 
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cause § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of 
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani-
cally applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress 
appears to have avoided considering ' 'vhat criteria would be 
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a per-
son can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. 
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to 
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions 
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A. 
v. Murry , 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti, 
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979). 
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the ex-
clusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of in-
dividuals whose care and treatment are bein~ fully provided 
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appel-
lant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not 
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes 
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees 
becavse they were thought to be less needy." /d ., at 32.7 
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides 
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental 
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a com-
fort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay 
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the 
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of 
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes 
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides 
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Ap-
pellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institu-
tionalized, disabled patients. 
'This conce~ion Illl:tke:; it difficult. to accept the Court's conclusion that. 
Congress rationally could huve decided that "Medicaid recipients in public 
institutions .. . are the most ueedy and the most deserving of the l:lllfalf 
monthly supplement." Ante, at 18' .. 
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could make the judg-
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any 
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsi-
bility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is 
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities. 
See U. S . D. A. v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508 (1973). Residence 
in a public mental hospital is rationally rela.ted to whether 
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion 
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd, sub nom. Le-
gion v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment 
whether the federal government should subsidize care for 
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult 
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at -. 
But, residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to 
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hos-
pital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program. 
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses, 
beyond the minimal care and trea.tment provided by Medic-
aid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1), 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash bene-
fit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and 
medical care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Fed-
eral Government is paying for the maintenance and medical 
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood 
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same. 
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refus-
ing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it 
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents. 
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been a 
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a 
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible peo-
ple solely because previously it rationally denied them Medic-
aid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applieq 
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals 
of one welfare prograin to another welfare program serving 
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly 
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no gov-
ernment interest. This irrational classification violates the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
The Supplemental Security Income .P'rogram (SSI) is a 
comprehensive federal program of mini.fual cash welfare ben-
efits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. A2 U. S. C. 
§ 1381~. See generally Califano v. Azn(tvorian, 439 
. S. 176, ' 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) of the Act, 
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e)(1)(A), operates to reduce substan-
tially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to other-
wise eligible persons who reside in public .institutions. The 
~a~on for this reduction of benefits is understandable: 
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the 
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
(a) 
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable 
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by 
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971). 
Bee also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort 
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the 
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that 
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611 
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paiu to an 
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he 
receives is compensible unuer the separate Medicaid program. 
Appellees are inuigent people disabled by mental illness, 
·and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1382CJ3)(A). (C). As residents of public men-
tal institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, they 
are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment. 
!d., § a)(17) (B).1 For this reason, and none other, ap-
pellees may not receive the reduceu mouthly SSI payments 
available to inmates of other medical institutions, including 
patients in public meuical hospitals and private mental 
1.... in~itutions.2 
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institu-
tions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal 
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354 
1 Otlwr ela.~S('S of in~titutionalizrd people urnied the n'tlucru SSI allow-
t\nce includr patient~S in tubercular institution::; and prison inmates. 
2 The Court too quickly dispatches the argument that. § 1611 (e) classi-
fies on the basi,; of ment.al illne,;s. While it is true that not all mentally 
ill people are dE-nied tlw benefit. and that some peoplr clrnird thr benefit 
are not. mentally ill , it is ine::;c•apable that appE-llees are denieu the bE-nefit 
because they a re patirnts in mental in:;titutions. Only thE' mentally ill 
are treated in mrntal in~tit.utions. Whil<' I would agrE-e that therr is no 
indication that Congress intended to Jllmi::;h or slight the mentally ill, the 
history of Medicaid dPmon:;tra tes Congre::;:-;' disinclination to involve the 
feclernl government in ~tatr t.rPatment of m~>ntal illness in public in::;titu-
t.ions. See, infra, at -. Berausc I find the classification irrational, I 
do not reach thr question whether elassifications drawn in part on thEt 
basis of mental health require heightened :;crutiny as appellee:; l:i llgge::;t, 
-~-
79-1380-DISSENT 
SCHWEIKEH v. WILSON 3 
F. Supp. 4 SDNY), aff'd sub norn. Legion v. Weinberger, 
414 U. S. 8 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused 
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L. 
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554, 
55~ (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have ex-
tended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental ill11ess in 
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42 
U.S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and to 
treatment of mental illuess of those under 25 and over 65 
in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396 {d1(a) (14). {:::1l:r 
1 {4P. Moreover, Congress has defined "lJUblic institution" 
ifo't to include a publicly operated community residence cen-
ter serving no more than 16 residents. /d., at§ 1382 (e)(1) 
(C). Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to 
the mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The re-
sidual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally 
ill from federal financial assistance rests on two related prin-
ciples: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of ad-
ministering this form of care, and the federal government 
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of 
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h) 
(1)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treat-
ment in mental institutions only when standards of utility 
are met). 
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why 
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coex-
tensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments.3 The 
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con ... 
3 The only indication of Congressional intPnt states: "No a.·sh;tance 
benefits will be paid to an individual in a penal in~titution." H. R Hep, 
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A mental ho~pital is not tt penal institution. 
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argues that the exclui:iion of a,ppellee::;-
from the comfort allowance rationally further::; this purpo:;e. 
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eluded that the States have the primary responsibility for 
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees. because 
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treat-
ment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justifica-
tion, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or 
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large rnental in-
stitutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' sup-
posed judgment. Ante, at 16, n. 20. 
II 
A 
Social aud economic legislation that does not employ sus-
pect classifications or impinge 011 fundamental rights must 
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment when the legislative means are.....rationally related 
U 
a legitimat. e government purpose. /f!ailroad Retirement 
oard v. Fritz,- U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio School 
oard v. Rodriyuez, 411 U. S., 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stated test 
holds two firmly established principles in t€nsion. The Court 
must uot substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy 
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people, 
ce v. ra ey, 440 U. S. ft 09 (1979); Dandridge, supra, 
at ~6, but the equal prote'clion requirement does place a 
substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular 
classes of citizens. E. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 
374- 375 (1974); Ja'rnes v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 
( 1972). Enforcing this prohibitiou while avoiding unwar-
ranted incursious on the legislative power presents a difficult 
task. No bright line divides the merely foolish from the 
arbitrary law.4 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-
_ 4 The Co~ ha;; employed num~s formulations for the "rationaf ) :·~·~:~('""')ad R'U"me"t ~~' F>it,,- U. S.-,-,-,.. 
79-1380-DISSENT 
SCHWEIKER v. WILSON 5 
joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong 
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce ben-
efits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful, 
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 42H 
U. S. 181. 185 (1976). 
The deference to which legislative accommodation of con-
flicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle 
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re-
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an impor-
tant touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how 
readily a policy can be discemed which the legislature in-
tended to serve. See, e. g., U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 
528, 536-538 ( 1973); M cGinn·is v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears 
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme 
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has 
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system re-
quires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose 
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae, 
- U. S. - (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479 
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the 
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates 
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted 
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose 
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government law-
yer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing 
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy 
choice as its absence.5 
n. 10 (1980). Membrr;:; of the Court continue to hold diverg_!"e:!.!n.!:..t ~.loi'IS-.mr-, 
1 the clarity with which a. lrgislative purpo;:;e must ll.ppearDee id., at -
(S'l'EYENH, J., concurring); id ., at - (BHENNAN, J., di::;::;pnting), tUld 
~ 
about the drgrPP of clrferrence affordPd the lrgi:,;lature in :mitiug nw~tns to 
end:;, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Cu., 220 U. S. 61, 7S-79 
( 1911) , with Royster Guauo Co . v. Virginia, 25:1 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 
5 Congress' fa1lure to make policy judgments can distort our system of 
separation of power::; by encouraging other branchc::; to make essentially 
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism 
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported 
by the legislative history.6 When IJO indication of legislative 
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secre-
tary, the Court should require that the classification bear a 
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This 
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test 
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal 
protection review as something more than "a mere tauto-
logical recognition of the fact that Congress did what it in- -jo,c. vrr;"5 
tended to do." Fritz, supra, at!! (STEVENS, J., .Qi~tting). 
B 
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history 
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to 
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As 
noted above, the only purpose identified in the House and 
SenatE:' Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates 
of penal im:titutions of all benefits. ~ee n. 2, supra. The 
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose be-
lrgislative uecisions . See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
743 (1979 (POWELL, J., di::;sentirg ). 
A u Some of our ca:>es ::;ugge;,;t that the actual purpose of a statute is 
..:..-- 'iiTerev,mr,-Ft~ng v. Nestor, :363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960) , and that the · 
statute must be upheld " if any ~:<tat e of fa ct::; reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify" its disc rimination , MrGowau v. Marylawl, :366 U. S. 
420, 426 (1901)• Although thPsc r a;,es pre~Prve an important caution, 
tlwy do not d~s~ibc the importance of actual Jegi::;lative purpose in our 
analysis. We recognize that a legi::;lative body rarely acts with a l:iingle 
mind and that compromis&; blur puqJol:ie. Therefore, it i ~ appropriate· 
to accord ::;orne deferen<'c to the executive '::; view of legislative intPnt, as 
~ imila rly we accord deference to th<' con:;i<; tent con:,1:ruction of a l:itatute 
by the administmtive ageney charged with its pnforcement. E . g., Udall · 
v. Tallman, 380 U . S. 1, 16 (1965) . Ascerta in mPut of actual purpose to 
t.he extent fPa!:iible, however, rPmaius an p::;sential ::; tep in Pqual protection. 
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cause § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of 
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani-
cally applyiug the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress 
appears to have avoided considering w·hat criteria would be 
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a per-
son can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. 
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to 
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions 
r~;..._---...:.:w:...:.il:.:.l ..::b::.::e:....::made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A. 
v. Murr y, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti, 
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979). 
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the ex-
clusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of in-
dividuals who~e care and treatment are being fully provided 
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appel-
lant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not 
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes 
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees 
becal'se they were thought to be less needy." !d., at 32.7 
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides 
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental 
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a com-
fort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay 
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the 
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of 
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes 
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides 
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Ap-
pellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institu-
tionalized, disabled patients. 
7 Thi:; conce:;:;ion make:; it difficul t to accept the Court's conclusion that 
Congre:;s ra tionally could have decided that "Medi CH id recipient ;; in public 
in;;titution::; .. . are the mo;; t needy and the most deserving of the small 
monthly supplement. " Ante, at 18. 
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could make the judg~ 
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any 
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsi-
/V1 U Y' r\t: no logical link however, between these two res )Onsibilities. 
}-
bility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is 
:-J See U. S. D. A. v. ~, 413 U. S. i63(1973). Residence 
in a public mental hQ"pital is ration;llv ~elated to whether 
I f the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion 
b f-r-------..:.v..;..  .:.:R:..:.ic:..:.·h.:.:a:.;,rd;;son, 354 F. Supp. 45 (SDNY). aff'd. sub norn. Le-
yion v. Weinberger, 4 4 . , . 1058 (1973). The judgment 
whether the federal government should subsidize care for 
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult 
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at -. 
But. residence in a public mental iustitution, as opposed to 
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hos-
pital, bears no relation to any policy of the ssr program. 
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses, 
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medic-
aid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1), 
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash bene-
fit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and 
medical care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Fed-
eral Government is paying for the maintenauce and medical 
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood 
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same. 
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refus-
ing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it 
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents. 
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been 1.. 
legislative oversight. I therefore dissent. 
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied ·a 
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible peo-
ple solely because previously it rationally denied them Medic-
aid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied 
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals 
of one welfare program to another welfare program serving 
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly 
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no gov-
ernment interest. This irrational classification violates the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
I 
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) is a 
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare ben-
efits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 86 Stat. 1465, 
42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. Set> generally Califano v. Azna-
vorian, 439 U. S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) 
of the Act, 42 U.S. C.§ 1382 (e)(l)(A). operat!:'-S to reduce 
substantially, to $25 per mo11th. the SST benefits available to 
otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. 
The reason for this reduction of benefit is understandable: 
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the 
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable 
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by 
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort 
allowance is provid!=ld to institution residents only if the 
qualified person resiqes in a public hospital or institution that 
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611 
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an 
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he 
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program. 
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness, 
and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (a) (3) (A), (C). As residents of public 
mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, 
they are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treat-
ment. !d., § 1396a (a)(17)(B).1 For this reason, and none 
other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI 
payments available to inmates of other medical institutions, 
including patients in public medical hospitals and private 
mental institutions.2 
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institu-
tions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal 
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354 
t Other classes of institutionalized people denied the reduced SSI allow-
ance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison inmates. 
• The Court too quickly dispa.tches the argument that § 1611 (e) classi-
fies on the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not. all mentally 
ill people are denied the benefit, and that some people denied the benefit 
are not mentally ill, it is inescapable that appellees are denied tJ1e benefit 
because they are patients in menta] inst.itutions. Only the mentally ill 
are trea.ted in mental institutions. While I would agree that there is no 
indication that Congress intended to punish or slight. the mentally ill, the 
history of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' di~inclination to involve the 
federal government in sta.te treatment of mental illnes~:; in public institu-
tion::;. See, infra, at -. Because I find the classification irrational, I 
do not reach the question whether classification~:; drawn in part on the· 
basis of mental health require heigbtencd scmtilly as appellees suggest .. 
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F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinoer17er, 
414 U. S. 1058 ( 1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused 
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L. 
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554, 
557-558 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have ex-
tended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in 
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.) , fu :d 
to treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and (, V.c'!' 
65 in public mental institutious, id., §§ 1396d (a)(14), (16 ). 
Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to 
include a publicly operated community residence center ser·v-
ing no more than 16 residents. ld., at §1382(e)(l)(C). 
Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to the 
mentally ill for treatment in various ·contexts. The resid-
ual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally ill 
from federal financial assistance rests on two related prin-
ciples: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of ad-
ministering this form of ca.re, and the federal government 
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of 
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h) 
( 1 )(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treat-
ment in mental institutions only when standards of utility 
are met). 
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why 
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coex-
tensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments.3 The 
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con-
1 The only indication of Congressional intent states: "No assistance 
benefits will be paid to an individual in a penal institution." H. R. Rep. 
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A ment.a.L ho:;pit<~l i:; not a penal institution. 
Neither the Secretary nor the CoUJi a.rgues that the exclusion of appellees 
from the comfort allowance rationally further:; this purpose. 
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eluded tha.Y the States have the primary responsibility for 
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because 
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treat-
ment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justifica-
tion, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or 
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental in-
stitutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' sup-
posed judgment. Ante, at i6, n. 20. 
II 
'A 
Social and economic legislation that does not employ sus-
pect classifications or impinge on fuudamental rights must 
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpoEe. U. S . Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Fritz, - U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio 
School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970) . This simply stat2d test 
holds two firmly established princij)les in tension. · The Court 
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy 
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people, 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979); Daudridye, supra, 
at 485-486. but the equal protection requirement does place 
' a substantive limit on legislative power. At a mi11imum, the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular 
classes of citizens. E . g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 
374- 375 (1974); James v. Stranye, 407 U. S. 128, 140 (1972); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 
( 1972). Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwar-
ranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult 
task. No. bright line divides the merely foolish from the 
arbitrary law.4 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-
~The Court has employed numercus formulations for the " rational 
basis" te:st. U. S . Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz , - U. S. - , - , 
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong 
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce ben-
efits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful, 
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 
U. S. 181, 185 (1976). 
The deference to which legislative accommodation of con-
flicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle 
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re-
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an impor-
tant touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how 
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature in-
tended to serve. See, e. g., U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears 
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme 
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has 
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system re-
quires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose 
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae, 
-· U. S. - (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479 
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet,· the 
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates 
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted 
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose 
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government law-
yer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing 
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy 
choice as its absence.a 
-, n. 10 (1980). Members of the Court continue to hold divergent 
views on the clarity with which a Jegi~lative purpose must appear, see id., 
at - (STEVENs, J., concurring) ; id, at - (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting), 
and about the degree of dderrence afforded the legislature in suiting 
means to ends, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co ., 220 U. S. 
61, 78-79 (1911), with Royster Guano Co . v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
( 1920). 
~ Congress' failure to make policy judgments can distort our system of 
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially 
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In my view, ~he Courf shpulfl rec~iye wi~h some skepticism 
post hoc hypotheses about legislp.t~ve purpose, unsupported 
by the legislative history.6 When no inqication of legislative 
purpose appears other than the cmrent position of the Secre-
tary, the Court should require that the classification bear a 
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This 
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test 
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal 
protection review as something more than "a mere tauto-
logical recognition of the fact that Congress did what it in-
tended to do." Fritz, supra, at- (tlTJWEN~, J., concurriug). 
B 
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history 
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to 
be served by denying appellees th~ smt:~,ll SSI allowance. As 
noted above, the only pu~pose identified in the House and 
Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates 
of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The 
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose be-
legislative decisions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 
743 (1979 (POWELL, J., di::;senting). 
6 Some of our cHses suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is 
irrC'levant, Flemming Y. Nestor. 363 U. S. 60;~, (H2 ( 1H60), aud that the 
statute must be upheld ' 'if any state of_ fact,.; reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify" it:; discrimination, McGowa;'t \•. Maryland, 366 U. S. 
420, 426 (19(il ). Although th~sE' C'a;E'::; J1rt•servp in i-mportant caution, 
they do not d :· ::; ~ ribe the importance of actual legislative purpo.·e in our 
analysis. We recognize that .a legislative body rarely acts with a single 
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to accord some deference to the executive's view of lE>gi>'lative intent, a::; 
~imilarly we accor.d deference to the cou~istent construction of a i:ltatute 
by the administrative agency charged with it:; enforcement . E. g., Udall 
v. Tallman, 380 U . S. 1, 16 (1965). Ascertainment of actual purpose to 
the extent feasible , however, rei"llains an e:;sential step in equal JJr~tection. 
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cause § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of 
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani-
cally applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress 
appears to have avoided considering what criteria would be 
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a per-
son can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. 
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to 
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions 
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A. 
v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti, 
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979). 
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the ex-
clusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of in-
dividuals whose care and treatment are beinp; fully provided 
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appel-
lant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not 
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes 
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees 
becaese they were thought to be less needy." /d., at 32.7 
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides 
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental 
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a com-
fort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay 
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the 
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of 
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes 
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides 
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Ap-
pellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institu-
tionalized, disabled patients. 
1 This conce::;~ion make::; it difficult to accept the Court's conclusion that 
Congrei:IS rationally could have decided that "Medicaid recipient;; in public 
in~titution::; ... are the most needy and the mo::,1 deserving of the snralf 
monthly supplement." Ante, at 18'. 
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But, it is a.rgued, Congress rationally could ma.ke the judg-
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any 
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsi-
bility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is 
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities. 
See U. S. D. A. v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508 (1973) . Residence 
in a public mental hospital is rationally related to whether 
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion 
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd, sub nom. Le-
gion v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment 
whether the federal government should subsidize care for 
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult 
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at -. 
But, residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to 
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hos-
pital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program. 
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses, 
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medic-
aid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1), 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. , 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash bene-
fit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and 
medical care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Fed-
eral Government is paying for the maintenance and medical 
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood 
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same. 
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refus-
ing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it 
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents. 
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been a 
legislative oversight. : I therefore dissent. 
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JusncE PowELL, with whom JusTICE BmmNAN, Jus'l'ICE ( 
MARSHALL, and JusTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. 
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a 
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible pea~ 
pie solely because previously it rationally denied them Medic-
aid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied 
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals 
of one welfare program to another welfare program serving 
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly 
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no gov-
ernment interest. This irrational classification violates the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of tho 
Fifth Amenqment, 
I 
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) is a 
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare ben-
efits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 86 Stat. 1465, 
42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. See generally Califano v. Azna-
vorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(l)(A) 
of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e) (1) (A). operates to reduce 
substantially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to 
otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. 
The reason for this reduction of benefit is understandable: 
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the 
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
FEB 27 19M 
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable 
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by 
the institution." H . R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort 
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the 
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that 
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611 
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an 
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he 
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program. 
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness. 
and thus otherwise are eligible for SST payments under 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (a) (3) (A), (C). As residents of public 
mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, 
they are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treat-
ment. Id., § 1396a (a)(17)(B).1 For this reason, and none 
other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly ssr 
payments available to inmates of other medical institutions, 
including patients in public medical hospitals and private 
mental institutions.2 
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institu-
tions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal 
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354 
1 Other classes of institutionalized people denied the reduced SSI allow-
ance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison inmates. 
2 The Court too quickly dispa.tches the argument that. § 1611 (e) classi-
fies on the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not all mentally 
ill people are denied the benefit. and that some people denied the benefit 
~~tre not mentally i!J, it is inescapable that appellees are denied the benefit 
because they are patients in mental ins1itutions. Only the mentally ill 
are treated in mental institutions. While I would agree that there is 110 
indication that Congress intended to punish or slight. the mentally ill, the 
history of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' disinclination to involve the 
federal government in state treatment of mental illness in public institu-
tions. See, infra, at -. BecauAe I find the classification irrational, I 
do not reach the que;,;tion whether classificationi:l drawn in part on thl:t 
basis or mental health require he~ghtened scrutiny as appellees suggest, 
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'F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), a:ff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 
414 U. S. 1058 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused 
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L. 
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554, 
557-558 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have ex-
tended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in 
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), ( 4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and 
to treatment of mental illness of those under 21 and over \ 
65 in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396d (a) (14), (16). 
Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to 
include a publicly operated community residence center serv-
ing no more than 16 residents. !d., at § 1382 (e)(1)(C). 
Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to the 
mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The resid-
ual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally ill 
from federal financial assistance rests on two related prin-
ciples: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of ad-
ministering this form of care, and the federal government 
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of 
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. & 
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h) 
(l)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treat-
ment in mental institutions only when standards of utility 
are met). 
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why 
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coex-
tensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments.3 The 
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con-
1 The only indication of Congressional intent stares: "No Msistance 
benefits will be paid to au individual in a penal institution." H. R. Rep, 
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A mental hospital is not a penal institution. 
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argues that the exclusion of appellees: 
from the cotnfort allowance rationally furthers this purpose. 
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eluded that the States have the primary responsibility for 
making payment~ of comfort allowances to appellees, because 
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treat-
ment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justifica-
tion, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or: 
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental in-
stitutions is irrelevfl'nt fO the rationality of Congress' sup~ 
posed judgment. Ante, at lp, n. 20. 
II 
A 
Social and economic leg~slation that does not employ sus-
pect classifications or i~pinge on fundamental rights must 
" be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related 
to a legitimate government purpoE:e. U. S. Railroad Retire.., 
ment Board v. Fritz, - U.S. - (1980). See San Antonia 
School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge. 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stakd test 
holds two firmly established principles in tension. The Court 
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy 
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people1 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra, 
at 485- 486, but the equal protection requirement does place 
3 substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the 
legislature cannot arbitrarily discriminate among citizens. 
E . g., Johuson V. RobisOil, 415 u.-S. 361 , 374- 375 (1974); 
James v. Strange, 407 F . S. 128, 140 ( 1972); Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co ., 406 U. S. 164, 175 ( 1972). Enforcing 
this prohibition while avoidiug unwarranted incursions on the 
legislative power presents a difficult task. No bright line 
divides the merely foolish from the arbitrary law.< Giveu 
' The Court. has employed numerous formulations for the "rational 
basis" te:;t . U. S Ratlroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz , - U. S. -, - ,, 
- , n. 10 ( 1950}. ~!ember" of the Court continue to hold divergent 
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this difficulty , legislation properly enjoys a presumption of 
rationality, which is particularly strong for welfare legislation 
where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with 
complex criteria requires painful, but unavoidable line draw-
ing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) 
The deference to which legislative accommodation of con-
flicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle 
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re-
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an impor-
tant touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how 
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature in-
tended to serve. See, e. g., U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears 
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme 
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has 
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system re-
quires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose 
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae, 
- · U. S. - (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479 
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the 
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates 
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted 
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose 
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government law-
yer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing 
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy 
choice as its absence.3 
views on the clarity with which a legi81ative purpose must appear, see id ., 
at - (8'1'EVENt>, J ., concurring); id, at - (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting) , 
and abo ut the degree of deferrence afforded the legislature in :ouiting 
means to ends , compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 
61, 78-79 (1911), with Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
( 1920). 
1 Congress' failure tQ make policy judgments can distort our system of 
~-eparation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially 
""' ... ... 
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism 
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported 
by the legislative history.~ When no indication of legislative 
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secre-
tary, the Court should require that the classification bear a 
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920) . This 
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test 
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal 
protection review as something more than "a mere tauto-
logical recognition of the fact that Congress did what it il1-
tended to do.'' Fritz, supra, at - (STEVENS, J., concurring) . 
B 
either the structure of ~ 1611 nor its legislative history 
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to 
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As 
noted above, the only purpose identified in the House and 
Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates 
of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The 
8tructure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose be-
legislative decisions. See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 U S. 677, 
743 (197() (POWELL , J ., dlssentiPg) . 
6 Some of our case5 suggest that the actual purpo~e of a statute is 
irrelevant, Ftemrmng v Nestor, ;l63 U S 603, 612 (1950) , and that the 
statute must be upheld "if any state of fact~ reasonably may be con-
ceived to JUStlfy" 1ts discrimmation, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 
420, 426 (1961) . Although these cas~:; preserve in important caution, 
the. do not d ~~:~mbe the importance of actual leg1slative purpose in our 
analys,~ . We recognize that a legi::;Jative body rarely acts with a ::;ingle 
mind and that compromises blur purpo;,e. Therefore, it IS appropriate 
to accord some deference to the executive's view of legislative intent, a;, 
similarly we tLccord deference to the contistent construction of a statute 
by the admm1strat1Ve agency charged w1th Its enforcement. E. g., Udall 
v l'allman, 380 U. S. I . 15 (19ti5) . Ascertainment of actual purpose to 
the PXtent ff'a:Slbl~-' howf'Vf'' r Prull1D8 an es~entw.l step in equal protection • 
• 
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l:&UsL· ~ loll (e ) is drawu in reference to the policies of 
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani~ 
cally applylllg the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress 
appears to have avoided considering what criteria would be 
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a per-
son can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment. 
The importation of eligibility critena from one statute to 
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions 
will be made between equally needy people. See U. S. D. A. 
" Murry, 413 U . S. 508, .114 ( Hl7!3) : Medora v Cnlauft?, 
602 F 2d U49 (CA3 l978 L 
The Secretary argues , and the Court agrees, that the ex -
du::mm · It'. rationally related to the legttimate legtslative 
desire Lu avoid spemhng tederal t•esources on behalf of in-
dlviduab who:::e care and treatment are bemg fully proVllkd 
for by stalk and local govemnH~llt units.1 Bnef for Appd-
lant 27 l'he Secretary does uot argue that appellees are uot 
in present need o1 the comfort allowance ; indeed, he coneedt:·s 
·'thaL the :;tatutory classification dues not exclude appellees 
bE>caPse they were thought to be less needy .' ld., at :3:2 
Nor· rloe::, Lhe Secretary suggest that becaus€ a ,State proviclet- \ 
h<~alth care and Lhe ueces:sities uf hfe to inmate& oi meutal 
hospitals , tlw State also Will prov1de the inmate with a com· 
forL allowance lndeed , the probability t.hat a Statt' will pay 
a patient a comfort allowance doe& not increase when the 
federal government refuse::. lo relieve lt of part of the cosL of 
the patient 's medical eare . fhp Court apparenLly recognizes 
this a& it states that whether or nut a State actually provide!~ 
a eomfort allowance 1::, nrelevant Ant!' , at lb, n. 20. Ap~· 
pellees simply are denied a benefit vrovided t.o other instit.u-
tlonahzed rhsabl~·~i pattellt..::,. 
; Tni,- cont ·e8~ion 11 1 ake~ !1. -i\ttwuli i <1 "'''''l' t tlH Cou rr~ t: tHH.:lusiun that· 
'.mgre~" rutl\lllall) could haH· d<·rtJed that ' :\ledic:aJd reeiptentti m pub!H· 
lm<ti1utioll" .. >til l.bf' 010~1 rH1·•cl\ and tl,c mo~t d esf'TVlll~ of the smalf 
_ nnlltld~· <i t JipiPliiPtol, ~~~ ~~ .c• \, 
···. 
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SLHWEIKER v 'WIL80. 
But, it i:o. argued, Congress rationally could make the judg-
ment. that the States should bear the responsibility for any 
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsi-
bility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is 
no logical link. however, between these two responsibilities. 
Ree (' . S. D A. v. Murru, 413 F. S. 508 (1973). Residence 
in a pubhc mental hospital i's rationally related to whether 
the C'ongres::. should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion 
v. Richardson, 354 F Supp. 456 (SDNY). aff'd. sub nom. Le-
giun \ Weinberyer, 414 L". S. 1058 (1973). The judgment 
whether the fetleral govemlllen t should subsidize care for 
the mentally il1 iu large pubhc iust1tutions involves difficult. 
quel:ltiont~ of rnedtea1 aud economic policy. Supra, at -. 
But. rel:lidence iu a publ~c mental institution. ru:; opposed to 
resideuce Ill a state med1cal hospital ur a private mental hos-
pital, bear::. uo relatJOH to any (JOhcy of the SSI program. 
Tht mouthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expeuses, 
beyond the miuimal care and Lreatmeut provided by Medic-
aid or "other prograru::. ' H. R Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1) , 
.J6th Cong 1st :-5e:sb, 1<>3 ( 197!:.1) If SSI pays a cash bene~ 
fi.t relating tu per::.oual need:s other than maintenance and 
mediea1 care, it i::. irrelevaut ~hether the Stat€ or the Fed-
~'ral Government is pl:l,ylllg for the mamtenance and medical 
care· the patieuts' need remam::. the same, the likelihood 
th l:l,t the pohcies of SSI w1ll be fulhlled remains the same. 
f conclude Lhat C01•gre::;::. had no rational reason for refus-
ing t pay a cwufort allowance to appellee, while paying it 
to numetoub otherwr::.e IdentiCally situated disabled indigents. 
Thi::: unexplaiued drfterence in treatment must have · been .a 
lt>!!.IHJar,lVf OVPfi.;Jghr • IJ('ff'fon dlsRf'nt. 
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